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INTRODUCTION
Trade dress, the overall image used to present a product to pur-
chasers, is an important marketing tool.2 Since properties of trade
dress can include a product's size, shape, color, graphics,!' and even,
for example, a restaurant's exterior and interior design,4 protection
of trade dress has become increasingly important.5 Under section
43(a) of the Lanham Act,6 which proscribes "false designation of
2. See Gary Schuman, Trademark Protection of Container and Package Configurations - A Primer,
59 Cm.-KENT L. REv. 779, 780 (1983) (explaining that "a distinct and appealing visual iden-
tity for a product" is goal of producers today).
3. See John H. Harland Co. v. Clarke Checks, Inc., 711 F.2d 966, 980. 219 U.S.P.Q(BNA) 515, 528 (11th Cir. 1983) (holding that trade dress includes product's size, shape,
color or color combinations, texture, graphics, or even producer's particular sales techniques
with respect to product); SIEGRUN D. KANE, TRADEMARK LAW: A PRACTxiIONER'S GUIDE 43
(1987) ("Product design as well as product packaging and labeling are now all referred to as
trade dress.").
4. See Associated Hosts, Inc. v. Moss, 207 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 973, 974 (W.D.N.C. 1979)
(finding that plaintiff's trade dress consisted of overall impression created by exterior design,
interior layout or floor plan, and furnishings and appointments of restaurant).
5. See, e.g., Daniel J. Gifford, The Interplay of Product Definition, Design and Trade Dress, 75
MINN. L. REV. 769, 779 (1991) (stating that while trade dress protection is not new, recently
there has been "exponential growth" in number of trade dress cases);Jere M. Webb, The Law
of Trade Dress Infringement: A Survey of Recent Developments, COMPUTER LAW., Sept. 1991, at 11
(noting tremendous increase in number of trade dress infringement cases in recent years).
6. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1988). Congress enacted the Lanham Act in 1946 to regulate
trademarks. Trademark (Lanham) Act of 1946, Pub. L. No. 79-489, 60 Stat. 427 (codified as
amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1127 (1988)). Prior to its revision in 1988, § 43(a) of the
Lanham Act provided:
(a) Any person who shall affix, apply, or annex, or use in connection with any goods
or services, or any container or containers for goods, a false designation of origin, or
any false description or representation, including words or other symbols tending
falsely to describe or represent the same, and shall cause such goods or services to
enter into commerce, and any person who shall with knowledge of the falsity of such
designation of origin or description or representation cause or procure the same to
be transported or used, shall be liable to a civil action by any person doing business
in the locality falsely indicated as that of origin or in the region in which said locality
is situated, or by any person who believes that he [or she] is or is likely to be dam-
aged by the use of any such false description or representation.
Id. § 43(a), 60 Stat. at 441 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)). See generally Joseph P.
Bauer, A Federal Law of Unfair Competition: What Should Be the Reach of Section 43(a) of the Lanham
Act?, 31 UCLA L. REV. 671, 672-703 (1984) (discussing history of unfair competition under
common law and under original § 43(a) of Lanham Act).
Congress enacted the Trademark Law Revision Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-667, 102 Stat.
3935 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1127 (1988)), to bring the Lanham Act into conformance
with recent changes in the law and with current business practices. S. REP. No. 515, 100th
Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5577, 5580. The Act amends § 43(a)
to reflect courts' interpretations of the section as a general law of unfair competition. Id. at
40, reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5603. The Act also codifies the courts' applications of the
remedies sections of the Lanham Act to unregistered trademarks. Id. at 39-40, reprinted in
1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5602. Additionally, the Act equivocally extends § 43(a) relief to cases of
deceptive advertising and disparagement. Id. at 41, rqrinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5603-04.
The revised § 43(a) provides:
(a) Any person who, on or in connection with any goods or services, or any
container for goods, uses in commerce any word, term, name, symbol, or device, or
738
1993] SECONDARY MEANING IN THE MAKING 739
origin,"' 7 trade dress may be protected from a competitor's appro-
priation.8 To prevail in a trade dress infringement case, the com-
plainant must prove that the trade dress is protectible 9 and show
that there is a likelihood of consumer confusion.' 0
In order to foster creativity and promote competition, courts have
become more willing to protect a producer's trade dress from in-
fringement.1 In so doing, however, some courts have relaxed the
standards of proof required to prevail in a trade dress infringement
suit. For example, courts have applied the doctrine of secondary
meaning in the making, 12 a judicial substitute for secondary mean-
ing.'3 Secondary meaning in the making provides a new producer
any combination thereof, or any false designation of origin, false or misleading de-
scription of the fact, or false or misleading representation of fact, which-
(1) is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive as to the affilia-
tion, connection, or association of such person with another person, or as to the
origin, sponsorship, or approval of his or her goods, services, or commercial activi-
ties by another person, or
(2) in commercial advertising or promotion, misrepresents the nature, characteris-
tics, qualities, or geographic origin of his or her or another person's goods, services,
or commercial activities, shall be liable in a civil action by any person who believes
that he or she is or is likely to be damaged by such act.
15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1988). See generally Todd B. Carver, Comment, What Is the Impact of the
Trademark Law Revision Act of 1988?, 16 DAYrON L. REV. 129, 146-49 (1990) (discussing effect
of Trademark Law Revision Act on § 43(a)).
7. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1988).
8. See S. REP. No. 1333, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 3-5 (1946), reprinted in 1946 U.S.C.C.A.N.
1274, 1277 (stating that purpose of Lanham Act is to protect manufacturers' good will and
prevent diversion of trade through misrepresentation). The legislative history accompanying
the 1988 amendments to the Lanham Act noted that courts have interpreted § 43(a) as creat-
ing, in essence, a federal law against unfair competition and have applied the section to cases
involving the infringement of unregistered marks, blatant imitations of trade dress and non-
functional configurations of goods, and false advertising claims. S. REP. No. 515, 100th
Cong., 2d Sess. 40 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5577, 5603.
9. To be protected, the trade dress must be nonfunctional and inherently distinctive or
have acquired secondary meaning. See infra notes 29-89 and accompanying text (discussing
functionality, distinctiveness, and secondary meaning as requirements for trade dress
protectibility).
10. Likelihood of confusion asks whether a defendant's product is of such appearance as
to cause substantial confusion among consumers regarding the source of the product. See
infra notes 90-95 and accompanying text (discussing likelihood of confusion as requirement
for upholding trade dress protectibility).
11. See Gifford, supra note 5, at 779-80 (observing that cases applying trade dress doc-
trine have expanded traditional trademark law to protect packaging, design, and overall image
of product). See generally McCARTHy, supra note 1, § 8, at 281-98 (discussing trade dress
protection).
12. See, e.g., Jolly Good Indus., Inc. v. Elegra Inc., 690 F. Supp. 227, 230-31, 9
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1534, 1536-38 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (finding producer's claim of secondary
meaning in the making persuasive in trade dress infringement suit); Elizabeth Taylor Cosmet-
ics Co. v. Annick Goutal, S.A.R.L., 673 F. Supp. 1238, 1244, 5 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1305, 1313
(S.D.N.Y. 1987) (holding that secondary meaning in the making entitled producer's product
to trade dress protection). Secondary meaning in the making prohibits deliberate copying of
a mark or trade dress that is in the process of acquiring distinctiveness. See infra notes 107-22
and accompanying text (discussing meaning and application of secondary meaning in the
making doctrine).
13. See infra notes 69-81 and accompanying text (defining secondary meaning in simple
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with trade dress protection much sooner than ordinarily would be
available under the stricter secondary meaning standards. 14
Recently, the doctrine of secondary meaning in the making
seemed ready for burial,' 5 only to be refashioned by the Supreme
Court, perhaps unwittingly, in the form of the "inherently distinc-
tive" test.16 Unfortunately, in substituting the inherently distinctive
test for the secondary meaning standard, the Supreme Court has
gone too far in its protection of trade dress, much to the detriment
of the competition that it hoped to foster.' 7
Part I of this Article reviews the requirements of proof in trade
dress infringement cases. Part II considers the judicial evolution of
secondary meaning in the making and examines the arguments for
and against the doctrine. Part III reviews secondary meaning in the
making's renaissance as the inherently distinctive test. Finally, Part
IV considers the problems created by the new inherently distinctive
test and argues that the Supreme Court went overboard in its deci-
sion to eliminate the secondary meaning requirement.
I. PROTECTION OF TRADE DRESS
[I]t is an absolute condition to any relief whatever that the plaintiff
in such cases show that the appearance of his wares has in fact
come to mean that some particular person-the plaintiff may not
be individually known-makes them, and that the public cares
terms as "buyer association" and providing relevant factors that courts examine to determine
existence of secondary meaning).
14. Compare National Lampoon, Inc. v. American Broadcasting Cos., 376 F. Supp. 733,
738, 182 U.S.P.O. (BNA) 24, 33-34 (S.D.N.Y.) (recognizing that doctrine of secondary mean-
ing in the making protects producers from piracy in early stages of product development),
aff'd, 497 F.2d 1343 (2d Cir. 1974) with Centaur Communications, Ltd. v. A/S/M Communi-
cations, Inc., 830 F.2d 1217, 1225, 4 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1541, 1547 (2d Cir. 1987) (observing
that proof of secondary meaning generally requires lengthy, continuous, and exclusive use of
mark culminating in consumer association of product's source) and 15 U.S.C. § 1052((0 (1988)
(permitting registration of mark that has become distinctive after five years of substantially
continuous and exclusive use).
15. See Laureyssens v. Idea Group, Inc., 964 F.2d 131, 137-39, 22 U.S.P.QO2d (BNA)
1811, 1816-18 (2d Cir. 1992) (rejecting doctrine of secondary meaning in the making). Prior
to Laureyssens, U.S. district courts in New York had employed the doctrine of secondary mean-
ing in the making, but the Second Circuit had failed to adopt the doctrine. See infra notes 111-
13 and accompanying text (discussing development of secondary meaning in the making in
case law).
16. See Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 112 S. Ct. 2753, 2758-61, 23 U.S.P.Q2d(BNA) 1081, 1083-86 (1992) (holding that inherently distinctive trade dress is protectible
under § 4 3(a) without showing that it has acquired secondary meaning); see also Howard R.
Popper, When Close Enough Is Too Close, RECORDER, Aug. 27, 1992, at 7 (suggesting that
Supreme Court's decision in Two Pesos overrules Second Circuit's requirement in Laureyssens of
secondary meaning showing).
17. See Two Pesos, 112 S. Ct. at 2760, 23 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1086 (refusing to require
showing of secondary meaning for inherently distinctive trade dress because protection of
trade dress fosters competition, while requiring showing of secondary meaning damages
"producer's competitive position").
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who does make them, and not merely for their appearance and
structure.... The critical question of fact at the outset always is
whether the public is moved in any degree to buy the article be-
cause of its source .... 18
[I]mitation is the life blood of competition. It is the unimpeded
availability of substantially equivalent units that permits the nor-
mal operation of supply and demand to yield the fair price society
must pay for a given commodity. ... Unless such duplication is
permitted, competition may be unduly curtailed with the possible
resultant development of undesirable monopolistic conditions.1 9
A. Proof of Infringement
Although a consumer may repeat a purchase based on the quality
of the product, the first hook may be the overall visual image cre-
ated by the producer. Since "imitation is the life blood of competi-
tion,"' 20 competitors are likely to follow suit and imitate the
successful trade dress.2 1 When imitation occurs, the originator of
the trade dress will likely file suit, alleging trade dress infringement
under section 43(a) of the Lanham Act.22
Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act protects an unregistered mark,
symbol, or trade dress from imitation if the dress is distinctive or has
acquired secondary meaning. 23 To prevail under a section 43(a)
claim, a plaintiff must show that (1) the trade dress is nonfunc-
tional;24 (2) the trade dress is inherently distinctive25 or has ac-
18. Crescent Tool Co. v. Kilborn & Bishop Co., 247 F. 299, 300-01 (2d Cir. 1917).
19. American Safety Table Co. v. Schreiber, 269 F.2d 255, 272, 122 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 29,
43 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 915 (1959).
20. Id.
21. See Bruce N. Proctor, Distinctive and Unusual Marketing Techniques: Are They Protectible
Under Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act? Should They Be?, 77 TRADEMARK REP. 4, 4 (1987) (observ-
ing that when product marketing techniques "achieve any modicum of success," competitors
tend to copy such techniques).
22. See id. (stating that aggrieved producers file suits under § 43(a) of Lanham Act for
protection of distinctive marketing techniques).
23. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1988) (prohibiting producers from using words, terms,
names, symbols, or devices in connection with their products that would confuse or deceive
consumers as to source of origin of products); see also infra note 28 and accompanying text
(discussing former circuit court split as to whether showing of secondary meaning is required
under § 43 to render trade dress protectible). Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act has been
widely interpreted to create a federal law of unfair competition that provides relief from copy-
ing of trade dress and infringement of unregistered trademarks. See John B. Pegram, Trade-
mark Protection of Product and Container Configurations, 81 TRADEMARK REP. 1, 8-9 (1991)
(explaining how courts since passing of Lanham Act in 1946 have interpreted scope of § 43(a)
to encompass broadly not only false designations or representations as to product origin but
also general common law as to protection for unregistered marks and unfair competition).
24. See infra notes 29-47 and accompanying text (discussing functionality doctrine).
25. See infra notes 49-59 and accompanying text (discussing categories of trademarks that
are classified as distinctive).
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quired secondary meaning;26 and (3) the defendant's trade dress is
confusingly similar to that of the plaintiff.2 7 Until recently, courts
were split as to whether inherently distinctive trade dress was pro-
tected without proof of secondary meaning. 28
1. Functionality
Functionality is an important factor in an analysis of trade dress
infringement. 29 It is ajudicially created doctrine which acts to sepa-
rate elements that may be protected as property rights or trade-
marks from those designs that the law will not permit any person to
appropriate or monopolize.30 In creating the doctrine, the courts
intended that its application would help prevent the creation of mo-
nopolies in designs that were protected by neither patent law nor
copyright law. 31
26. See infra notes 69-81 and accompanying text (discussing factors relevant to establish
secondary meaning).
27. See infra notes 90-95 and accompanying text (discussing determination of likelihood
of consumer confusion).
28. Compare Laureyssens v. Idea Group, Inc., 964 F.2d 131, 133, 22 U.S.P.Q2d (BNA)
1811, 1816 (2d Cir. 1992) (requiring demonstration that product's appearance has acquired
secondary meaning before product's trade dress may become protectible); Coach
Leatherware Co. v. AnnTaylor, Inc., 933 F.2d 162, 168, 18 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1907, 1912 (2d
Cir. 1991) (holding that proof of secondary meaning is prerequisite of trade dress infringe-
ment claim); Wallace Int'l Silversmiths, Inc. v. Godinger Silver Art Co., 916 F.2d 76, 79, 16
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1555, 1557 (2d Cir. 1990) (requiring that trade dress identify source of
product in order to obtain trade dress protection), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 1622 (1991) and
Black & Decker Mfg. Co. v. Ever-Ready Appliance Mfg. Co., 684 F.2d 546, 547-48, 215
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 97, 100 (8th Cir. 1982) (upholding district court decision requiring showing
of secondary meaning for obtention of trade dress protection) with Schwinn Bicycle Co. v.
Ross Bicycles, Inc., 870 F.2d 1176, 1182, 10 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1001, 1006 (7th Cir. 1989)
(stating that plaintiff must show either inherent distinctiveness or secondary meaning to pre-
vail on trade dress infringement claim); AmBrit, Inc. v. Kraft, Inc., 812 F.2d 1531, 1535-37, 1
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1161, 1164-66 (5th Cir. 1986) (finding plaintiff's product inherently dis-
tinctive and providing that plaintiff need only prove distinctiveness or secondary meaning to
obtain trade dress protection), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1041 (1987) and Chevron Chem. Co. v.
Voluntary Purchasing Groups, Inc., 659 F.2d 695, 702, 212 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 904, 911 (5th
Cir.) (holding that further proof of secondary meaning is not necessary in trade dress in-
fringement suit where product is inherently distinctive), cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1126 (1981).
29. See A. Samuel Oddi, The Functions of "Functionality"in Trademark Law, 76 TRADEMARK
REP. 308, 311 (1986) (stating that functionality serves important purpose of balancing free
competition and trademark protection). But see Beth F. Dumas, Note, The Functionality Doctrine
in Trade Dress and Copyright Infringement Actions: A Call for Clarification, 12 HAs-riNGs COMM. &
ENTr. LJ. 471, 471 (1990) (arguing that applying functionality in trade dress cases is problem-
atic because federal courts have developed myriad functionality tests); Jessica Litman, Note,
The Problem of Functional Features: Trade Dress Infringement Under Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act,
82 COLUM. L. REV. 77, 81-97 (1982) (arguing that incorporation of doctrine of functionality in
trade dress infringement cases has led to judicial inconsistency and that proper test is source
confusion).
30. See, e.g., Sicilia Di R. Biebow & Co. v. Cox, 732 F.2d 417,429 (5th Cir. 1984) (stating
that ultimate question in functionality analysis is whether protecting product will interfere
with competition); Keene Corp. v. Paraflex Indus., Inc., 653 F.2d 822, 824, 211 U.S.P.Q,
(BNA) 201, 202-03 (3d Cir. 1981) (holding that purpose of functionality doctrine is to avoid
product monopoly).
31. See, e.g., In re Deister Concentrator Co., 289 F.2d 496, 501, 503, 129 U.S.P.Q (BNA)
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Courts have experienced problems in defining the doctrine of
functionality.3 2 As a result, there are almost as many ways to define
functionality as there are judicial circuits. 33 The most widely used
definition of functionality is that found in section 742 of the Restate-
ment of Torts, which provides, "A feature of goods is functional.., if
it affects [the goods'] purpose, action or performance, or the facility
or economy of processing, handling or using them."3 4 The test of
functionality is whether the feature is essential to the product's use
or quality,3 5 or whether designing around the feature would be
costly for a competitor.36 If the feature is essential to the product's
use, then it is functional and may not be protected.3 7 For example,
if a pentagonal-shaped speaker produces superior sound and a five-
sided loudspeaker enclosure is essential to the performance of the
system, then the speaker as well as the enclosure is functional. 38
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit broadened the
Restatement definition of functionality to include the concept of "aes-
thetic functionality." 3 9 Aesthetic functionality denies trademark
314, 319, 321 (C.C.P.A. 1961) (stating that court's basic consideration is to encourage compe-
tition by all fair means, which includes right to copy except in cases of copyright or patent,
and recognizing that "functional" shapes are of such nature that law never permits their mo-
nopolization); Marvel Co. v. Pearl, 133 F. 160, 161-62 (2d Cir. 1904) ("In the absence of
protection by patent, no person can monopolize ... elements of mechanical construction
which are essential to the successful practical operation of a manufacture, or which primarily
serve to promote its efficiency for the purpose to which it is devoted.").
32. See Litman, supra note 29, at 86 (explaining that courts have applied functionality
doctrine using various definitions and procedural rules). Compare Schwinn Bicycle, 870 F.2d at
1189, 10 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1012 (defining functionality as feature that is "costly to design
around or do without") with Cox, 732 F.2d at 429 (holding that functionality requires design to
be superior "in terms of engineering, economy of manufacture, or accommodation of utilita-
rian performance").
33. See Dumas, supra note 29, at 480-89 (setting forth various functionality tests devel-
oped by circuit courts); see also Peter E. Mims, Note, Promotional Foods and the Functionality Doc-
trine: An Economic Model of Trademarks, 63 Tax. L. REV. 639, 644-47 (1984) (discussing courts'
differing procedures in determining functionality).
34. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 742 (1938). This definition of functionality does not ap-
pear in the Restatement (Second) of Torts because the developing law of unfair competition and
trademarks has become less reliant on tort law. Keene, 653 F.2d at 824 n.2, 211 U.S.P.Q.
(BNA) at 203 n.2.
35. Inwood Lab., Inc. v. Ives Lab., Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 850 n.10, 214 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 1, 4
n.10 (1982).
36. See id. (noting that any feature affecting cost of product is functional); Schwinn Bicy-
cle Co. v. Ross Bicycles, Inc., 870 F.2d 1176, 1189, 10 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1001, 1012 (7th Cir.
1989) (holding that design feature that is "costly to design around or do without" is
functional).
37. MCCARTHY, supra note 1, §§ 7.26, 8.6, at 235, 296.
38. See In re Bose Corp., 772 F.2d 866, 873, 227 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 1, 6 (Fed. Cir. 1985)
(finding that "logic dictates that the shape of a speaker enclosure which conforms to the shape
of the sound matrix is an efficient and superior design as an enclosure, and thus, de jure
functional, whether or not it contributes to the functionality of the sound system itself"); see
also Inwood Lab., 456 U.S. at 850 n.10 ("[A] product feature is functional if it is essential to the
use or purpose of the article or if it affects the cost or quality of the article.").
39. See Pagliero v. Wallace China Co., 198 F.2d 339, 343, 95 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 45, 48-49
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protection to decorative or ornamental product features unless the
primary purpose of the features serves to identify the source of the
product and to distinguish one product from another.40 The central
question under the doctrine of aesthetic functionality is whether the
particular feature is an "important ingredient" in the commercial
success of the product.4' If the answer is yes, then the consumer
interest in free competition permits the feature's imitation in the ab-
sence of a patent or a copyright. 42
It is not clear on whom the burden of proof of functionality falls. 48
There is a split in the circuits as to whether the plaintiff bears the
responsibility of proving his or her trade dress is nonfunctional 44 or
whether it is the defendant's burden to prove that the trade dress is
(9th Cir. 1952) (holding that china pattern was functional where design was crucial to com-
mercial success of product). Samuel Oddi explains that the doctrine of aesthetic functionality
originated with the Restatement of Torts, § 742, comment (a). Oddi, supra note 29, at 315. Com-
ment (a) states: "When goods are bought largely for their aesthetic value, their features may
be functional [in that they] aid the performance of an object for which the goods are in-
tended." RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 742 cmt. a (1938).
40. See MCCARTHY, supra note 1, § 7:6, at 193-94 (discussing denial of protection to
"merely ornamental" features where features do not serve to identify producer).
41. Pagliero, 198 F.2d at 343, 95 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 48. The doctrine of aesthetic func-
tionality, like that of secondary meaning in the making, see infra notes 107-22 and accompany-
ing text (discussing meaning and application of secondary meaning in the making), has had its
share of controversy. The doctrine has been the subject of both scholarly criticism, see, e.g.,
DeborahJ. Kreiger, Note, The Broad Sweep of Aesthetic Functionality: A Threat to Trademark Protec-
tion of Aesthetic Product Features, 51 FORDHAM L. REv. 345, 362-86 (1982) (arguing that aesthetic
functionality ignores integral nature of aesthetics and marketing and may serve to numb imag-
inations), and judicial criticism. See, e.g., Sicilia Di R. Biebow & Co. v. Cox, 732 F.2d 417,427-
28 (5th Cir. 1984) (finding Pagliero definition of functionality too broad on ground that defin-
ing functionality as "important ingredient" would too often allow second comer to imitate
successful trade dress of product that has accumulated good will); John H. Harland Co. v.
Clarke Checks, Inc., 711 F.2d 966, 983 n.27, 219 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 515, 530 n.27 (11th Cir.
1983) (rejecting argument that proper definition of functionality included feature that "ap-
peals to the consumer and affects his or her choice" as "overly broad"); Keene Corp. v.
Paraflex Indus., Inc., 653 F.2d 822, 825-26, 211 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 201, 203 (3d Cir. 1981)
(stating that broad construction of aesthetic functionality doctrine acts to curtail imagination).
Even the Ninth Circuit has retreated from its "important ingredient" test to observe that any
feature that contributes to consumer appeal is a functional element, but if the feature also
serves to indicate quality and source, it should be protected. Vuitton et Fils S.A. v. J. Young
Enters., Inc., 644 F.2d 769, 774-75, 212 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 85, 89-90 (9th Cir. 1981). But see Jay
Dratler, Jr., Trademark Protection for Industrial Designs, 1988 U. ILL. L. REv. 887, 938-42 (sug-
gesting that doctrine of aesthetic functionality is far from dead and recommending that func-
tionality doctrine should draw line between ornamentation and utility).
42. Pagliero, 198 F.2d at 343, 95 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 48.
43. See KANE, supra note 3, at 49 (observing that some doubt exists as to whether plaintiff
has burden of proving nonfunctionality in order to obtain Section 43(a) relief or whether
defendant must prove functionality as defense).
44. See, e.g., Merchant & Evans, Inc. v. Roosevelt Building Prods. Co., 963 F.2d 628, 633,
22 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1730, 1733 (3d Cir. 1992) ("Although courts are split as to who bears
the burden of proof in the issue of functionality, this court placed the burden on the plaintiff
to prove non-functionality."); Rachel v. Banana Republic, Inc., 831 F.2d 1503, 1506, 4
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1877, 1880 (9th Cir. 1987) ("In this circuit.., we have placed the burden
of proof [of nonfunctionality] on the plaintiff.").
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functional. 45 Most authority, however, treats functionality as an af-
firmative defense.46  Regardless of proof, once a design or trade
dress has been determined functional, it is not protectible, despite
any evidence of secondary meaning or source confusion.47 If found
nonfunctional, however, questions remain as to whether a design or
trade dress is inherently distinctive or has acquired secondary mean-
ing and whether any likelihood of confusion exists as to the source
of the product.48
2. Distinctiveness
Distinctiveness is a trademark classification term49 meaning that
the mark or trade dress is capable of distinguishing a producer's
goods or services from those of its competitors.50 Courts place po-
tential trademarks into four categories5 l in an order that roughly
corresponds to the degree of trademark protection accorded them:
45. See Abbott Lab. v. Mead Johnson & Co., 971 F.2d 6, 20, 23 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1663,
1673 (7th Cir. 1992) ("[F]unctionality is actually an affirmative defense as to which [defend-
ant] bear[s] the burden of proof.").
46. See, e.g., LeSportsac, Inc. v. K Mart Corp., 754 F.2d 71, 76, 225 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 654,
657 (2d Cir. 1985) (stating that "burden... falls on the defendant to prove functionality"); see
also Rachel, 831 F.2d at 1506 n.2, 4 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1880 n.2 (acknowledging that weight
of authority treats functionality as defense).
47. See Coach Leatherware Co. v. AnnTaylor, Inc., 933 F.2d 162, 168, 18 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1907, 1912 (2d Cir. 1991) (holding that trade dress infringement claim will fail if dis-
puted feature is functional, even where plaintiff proves secondary meaning and confusion); see
also Famolare, Inc. v. Melville Corp., 472 F. Supp. 738, 744-45, 203 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 68, 74
(D. Haw. 1979) (ruling that functional features are not entitled to trademark protection even
if those features may, in addition, identify source of product), aft'd, 652 F.2d 62 (9th Cir.
1981).
48. See Mark I. Peroff& NancyJ. Deckinger, "Conditional" Functionality: The New Standard
for Evaluating "Aesthetic" Functionality Established by the Second Circuit in Wallace International
Silversmiths, Inc. v. Godinger Silver Art Co., I FORDHAM Err. MEDIA & INTELL. PROP. L.F.
117, 138-39 (1991) (discussing statutory and common law requirements of evaluating
whether challenged trade dress is "confusingly similar" once trade dress has been proclaimed
protectible and nonfunctional).
49. See MCCARTHY, supra note 1, § 11:1, at 433 (explaining that distinctiveness, either
inherent or acquired as secondary meaning, is needed for trademark status).
50. MCCARTHY, supra note 1, § 3:1, at 103.
51. See, e.g., Ambrit, Inc. v. Kraft, Inc., 812 F.2d 1531, 1537, 1 U.S!P.Q.2d (BNA) 1161,
1165 (11 th Cir. 1986) (dividing trademarks and trade dress into four categories), cert. denied,
481 U.S. 1041 (1987); Zatarain's, Inc. v. Oak Grove Smokehouse, Inc., 698 F.2d 786, 790, 217
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 988, 993 (5th Cir. 1983) (stating that both courts and commentators separate
potential trademarks into four classifications); Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting World,
Inc., 537 F.2d 4, 9-11, 189 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 759, 764-66 (2d Cir. 1976) (setting forth and
explaining four categories of trademarks).
746 THE AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 42:737
(1) generic; 52 (2) descriptive;53 (3) suggestive;54 and (4) arbitrary or
fanciful. 55 Of these four categories, the last two, "suggestive" and
"arbitrary or fanciful," are considered to be "inherently distinc-
tive," that is, capable of federal registration without any further
proof of secondary meaning.56
Similarly, trade dress that has been classified as arbitrary because
52. See Abercrombie & Fitch, 537 F.2d at 11, 189 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 766 (defining generic
terms as those that refer to type or class of goods and noting as example that term "safari" is
generic for expedition into African wilderness). Generic terms cannot serve as trademarks.
kd at 9, 189 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 764. See generally MCCARTHY, supra note 1, § 12, at 519-76
(discussing meaning and application of generic terms).
53. See MCCARTHY, supra note 1, § 11:5, at 442-43 (defining descriptive terms as those
that identify significant characteristic(s) of goods or services). Courts have developed various
tests for determining whether a product's term or mark is descriptive. Among the tests ap-
plied are the basic dictionary definition of "descriptive," see Vision Center v. Opticks, Inc.,
596 F.2d 111, 116, 202 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 333, 338 (5th Cir. 1979) (applying dictionary test to
conclude that words "vision center" describe nature of services performed); the imagination
test, used to distinguish between descriptive and suggestive terms, see Union Carbide Corp. v.
Ever-Ready Inc., 531 F.2d 366, 379, 188 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 623, 635 (7th Cir.) (approving of
imagination test and holding that "incongruity is a strong indication of non-descriptiveness"),
cert. denied, 429 U.S. 830 (1976); the necessity standard, reasoning that other producers need
to use certain terms to describe a product, see Zatarain's, 698 F.2d at 793, 217 U.S.P.Q (BNA)
at 996 (finding term "fish fry" necessary to describe batter for frying fish), and the common
use test, indicating that the term is not unusual in the field, see Vision Center, 596 F.2d at 117,
202 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 339 (finding that words "vision center" have been used by many opti-
cal stores throughout United States). See generally Zatarain's, 698 F.2d at 792-93, 217 U.S.P.Q
(BNA) at 994 (setting forth tests courts have used in making descriptive determination).
As a general rule, descriptive terms or marks are not registrable. 15 U.S.C. § 1052(e)
(1988). Descriptive marks that have become "distinctive," that is, have acquired "secondary
meaning," however, are registrable with proof of substantially exclusive and continuous use
of the mark for five years prior to the date that the distinctiveness claim is made. Id. § 1052(0;
see infra notes 60-89 and accompanying text (discussing secondary meaning). An example of a
descriptive term is PORTLY for larger men's clothing.
54. See Stix Prods., Inc. v. United Merchants & Mfrs., Inc., 295 F. Supp. 479, 488, 160
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 777, 785 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) (defining suggestive terms as those that require
"imagination, thought and perception" to ascertain true nature of goods or services pro-
vided). See generally MCCARTHY, supra note 1, § 11:20, at 488-502 (discussing suggestive
marks). An example of a suggestive term is SAFARI for boots. Abererombie &Fitch, 537 F.2d at
12, 189 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 766-67.
55. See Abercrombie & Fitch, 537 F.2d at 11 n.12, 189 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 766 n.12 (noting
that arbitrary marks consist of words or symbols in common usage that are applied to goods
or services in way that is neither descriptive nor suggestive). An example is the term IVORY
for soap. Id. at 9 n.6, 189 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 764 n.6. Fanciful marks are those that are
created solely for use as a trademark, such as EXXON. Id. at 11 n.12, 189 U.S.P.O. (BNA) at
766 n.12. See generally MCCARTHY, supra note 1, § 11:3-:4, at 436-42 (discussing fanciful and
arbitrary marks).
Arbitrary or fanciful marks or features are in seemingly endless supply for use in marketing
products. Chevron Chem. Co. v. Voluntary Purchasing Groups, Inc., 659 F.2d 695, 702-03,
212 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 904, 911 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1126 (1981). In light of this fact,
courts should focus on whether consumers will be confused by imitations, rather than on
whether the original producer's feature has secondary meaning. Id. at 703, 212 U.S.P.Q
(BNA) at 911-12.
56. Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, Inc., 537 F.2d 4, 11, 189 U.S.P.Q,
(BNA) 759, 765 (2d Cir. 1976); see MCCARTHY, supra note 1, § 11:2, at 435 (stating that inher-
ently distinctive marks need no further proof of secondary meaning for registrability). But see
infra note 28 and accompanying text (discussing former split of authority as to whether inher-
ently distinctive trade dress requires proof of secondary meaning).
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it possesses features that neither assist in describing the product nor
assist in the product's effective packaging may also be considered
inherently distinctive.5 7 To determine if a trade dress is inherently
distinctive, a court must examine the trade dress and consider fac-
tors such as whether it is a "common" design, whether it is "unique
or unusual" in a particular market area, and whether it is merely a
subtle alteration in an otherwise well-known form of ornamentation
for a particular class of goods that the public views as a dress or
ornamentation for the goods.58 Trade dress that is not inherently
distinctive, however, must exhibit proof of secondary meaning to be
protectible. 59
3. Secondary meaning
Secondary meaning is also an established doctrine in trademark
and unfair competition law.6 0 At common law, descriptive words or
phrases could not become trademarks upon mere adoption and
use.61 Trademark rights could not be conferred on a descriptive
term because the courts believed that assigning a property right in a
descriptive term would preclude its use by others who were likely to
find the term useful in describing their products. 62 For similar rea-
sons, the common law of trademarks denied protection to package
57. See Chevron, 659 F.2d at 702, 212 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 911 (maintaining that trade dress
packaging, like word marks, could be classified as arbitrary and thus distinctive); accord Am-
Brit, Inc. v. Kraft, Inc., 812 F.2d 1531, 1536-37, 1 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1161, 1167 (11th Cir.
1986) (upholding district court finding that arbitrary features rendered product inherently
distinctive), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1041 (1987). It was the clash between the Fifth Circuit's
Chevron viewpoint that inherently distinctive trade dress may be protectible without further
proof of consumer association, and the Second Circuit's rulings that trade dress protection
requires a showing of secondary meaning regardless of its distinctiveness, that gave rise to the
Supreme Court's decision in Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 112 S. Ct. 2753, 23
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1081 (1992). See infra notes 230-49 and accompanying text (discussing
Supreme Court's decision in Two Pesos).
58. See Seabrook Foods, Inc. v. Bar-Well Foods, Ltd., 568 F.2d 1342, 1344, 196 U.S.P.O.
(BNA) 289, 291 (C.C.P.A. 1977) (setting forth factors for determining whether design is arbi-
trary or distinctive).
59. MCCARTHY, supra note 1, §§ 7:7, 11:15-:19, at 196-97, 466-87.
60. See MCCARTHY, supra note 1, § 15, at 656-716 (providing extensive analysis of scope
and application of secondary meaning doctrine).
61. See MCCARTHY, supra note 1, § 11:5, at 442 (explaining that prior to passage of Lan-
ham Act in 1946, descriptive terms were not registrable as marks); see also supra note 53 (dis-
cussing protectibility of descriptive terms).
62. See G. & C. Merriam Co. v. Saalfield, 198 F. 369, 373 (6th Cir. 1912) (holding that
"one may not appropriate to his own exclusive use" descriptive words or marks because they
"are of public or common right"); Zatarain's, Inc. v. Oak Grove Smokehouse, Inc., 698 F.2d
786, 793, 217 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 988, 995 (5th Cir. 1983) (explaining that courts look to
whether marks are useful in describing products in determining if marks are descriptive and,
therefore, not protectible); Jean Patou, Inc. v. Jacqueline Cochran, Inc., 201 F. Supp. 861,
865, 133 U.S.P.Q (BNA) 242, 246 (S.D.N.Y. 1962) (explaining that while.it is desirable to
protect person whose products have acquired secondary meaning, it is also undesirable to
block channels of expression by awarding protection to all who appropriate ordinary descrip-
tive word for business use), af'd, 312 F.2d 125, 136 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 236 (2d Cir. 1963).
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configurations6 3 or symbols64 upon mere adoption and use. Unfair
competition law, however, did afford protection against the copying
of descriptive terms6 5 or package configurations where, through
use, secondary meaning had been acquired. 66 The judicial doctrine
of secondary meaning recognizes that a descriptive word or phrase,
after a period of time and exclusive association with particular
goods or services, can identify the goods or services with their pro-
ducer.67 Similarly, when a producer could show consumer-source
association in his or her trade dress or configuration, the trade dress
was protectible at common law.6 8
Simply put, secondary meaning is buyer association.6 9 Although
63. MCCARTHY, supra note 1, § 7:23, at 189.
64. MCCARTHY, supra note I, § 4:3, at 99.
65. See Hanover Star Milling Co. v. Allen & Wheeler Co., 208 F. 513, 517 (7th Cir. 1913)(setting forth rationale for protecting descriptive marks by stating that reason for granting
relief "was to stop the defendant's dishonesty in trade, [regardless of] whether the fraud-doer
was filching trade by means of using others' marks... in their secondary meaning"), aof'd, 240
U.S. 403 (1916); see also MCCARTHY, supra note 1, § 4:3, at 100-01 (discussing archaic distinc-
tion between trade names and trademarks, with law of unfair competition protecting trade
names).
66. MCCARTHY, supra note 1, § 4:3, at 102.
67. See Aloe Creme Lab., Inc. v. Milsan, Inc., 423 F.2d 845, 848, 165 U.S.P.Q (BNA) 37,
39-40 (5th Cir.) (explaining that doctrine of secondary meaning is one expression of courts'
reaction to realities of modem business), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 928 (1970); G. & C. Meniam,
198 F. at 373 (defining secondary meaning as descriptive word or phrase that has become
exclusively associated with producer's article and identifies that article as emanating from pro-
ducer); see also Zatarain 's, 698 F.2d at 795, 217 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 997-98 (holding that finding
of secondary meaning requires that term or mark "must denote to the consumer 'a single
thing coming from a single source' ") (quoting Coca-Cola Co. v. Koke Co., 254 U.S. 143, 146
(1920)). See generally MCCARTHY, supra note 1, § 15:1, at 657 (stating that secondary meaning
is acquisition of distinctiveness for those marks that are merely descriptive).
68. See, e.g., Tas-T-Nut Co. v. Variety Nut & Date Co., 245 F.2d 3, 5-6, 113 U.S.P.Q0(BNA) 493, 495-96 (6th Cir. 1957) (holding that general rule permitting imitation in absence
of patent does not control where trade dress has acquired secondary meaning); Spangler
Candy Co. v. Crystal Pure Candy Co., 235 F. Supp. 18, 29, 143 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 94, 103 (N.D.
Ill. 1964) (finding that similarity in package configurations will not support injunction without
proof of secondary meaning); Chun King Sales, Inc. v. Oriental Foods, Inc., 136 F. Supp. 659,
665, 108 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 400, 405 (S.D. Cal. 1955) (holding that innovators have no right to
be free from imitation of trade dress without showing of source confusion). But see supra note
28 and accompanying text (recognizing past split of authority as to whether showing of secon-
dary meaning was required for trade dress protection).
69. See Schuman, supra note 2, at 805-06 (discussing function of buyer association and
secondary meaning in protection of package designs); see also Coach Leatherware Co. v.
AnnTaylor, Inc., 933 F.2d 162, 168, 18 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1907, 1912 (2d Cir. 1991) (explain-
ing that secondary meaning exists when consuming public "associates" feature with particular
source). Defining secondary meaning as buyer association asks with what the buyer associates
a particular mark or dress. Vincent N. Palladino, Techniques for Ascertaining If There Is Secondary
Meaning, 73 TRADEMARK REP. 391, 393-94 (1983). The Supreme Court explains that secon-
dary meaning is an association between a feature and the "source of the product rather than
the product itself." Inwood Lab., Inc. v. Ives Lab., Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 851 n.1l, 214 U.S.P.Q,(BNA) 1, 4 n.ll (1982). Definition of secondary meaning can be categorized as (1) trade
dress associated with a single product; (2) trade dress associated with the product of a single
producer; and (3) trade dress associated with a single producer. Palladino, supra, at 394; see
MCCARTHY, supra note 1, § 15:2, at 661 (setting forth various judicial definitions of secondary
meaning).
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it is not necessary to prove that consumers are able to identify the
producer or source of the product,70 proof of secondary meaning is
not easily established.7' In determining whether the mark or trade
dress has acquired secondary meaning, courts examine several fac-
tors,72 which may include any or all of the following: (1) consumer
surveys;7 3 (2) evidence of intentional copying by the defendant;7 4
(3) advertisement expenditures; 75 (4) sales success; 76 (5) length and
70. See Union Carbide Corp. v. Ever-Ready, Inc., 531 F.2d 366, 380, 188 U.S.P.Q. (BNA)
623, 636 (7th Cir.) (holding that "[i]t is sufficient if the public is aware that the product comes
from a single, though anonymous, source"), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 830 (1976). The Lanham
Act was clarified in 1988 and now reflects this judicial consensus. See 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (1988)
("The term 'trademark' includes any word, name, symbol or device or combination thereof -
used ... to indicate the source of the goods, even if that source is unknown.").
71. See Coach Leatherware, 933 F.2d at 169, 18 U.S.P.Q2d (BNA) at 1912 (recognizing
that "proof of secondary meaning entails vigorous evidentiary requirements"). See generally
William F. Gaske, Note, Trade Dress Protection: Inherent Distinctiveness as an Alternative to Secondary
Meaning, 57 FORDHAM L. REv. 1123, 1135-37 (1989) (discussing difficult burden of proof for
secondary meaning).
72. See Thompson Medical Co. v. Pfizer Inc., 753 F.2d 208, 217, 225 U.S.P.Q. (BNA)
124, 132 (2d Cir. 1985) (listing factors relevant to proof of secondary meaning). See generally
MCCARMY, supra note 1, § 15:10-:20, at 683-704 (discussing, at length, factors considered by
court in determining secondary meaning).
73. See, e.g., American Television & Communications Corp. v. American Communica-
tions & Television, Inc., 810 F.2d 1546, 1549, 1 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 2084, 2086-87 (1 lth Cir.
1987) (finding that failure to submit survey evidence of secondary meaning is compelling
evidence that none existed); see also Palladino, supra note 69, at 395-404 (providing practical
suggestions for identifying secondary meaning through consumer surveys). But see Coach
Leatherware Co. v. AnnTaylor, Inc., 933 F.2d 162, 169, 18 U.S.P.Q2d (BNA) 1907, 1913 (2d
Cir. 1991) (hesitating to rely on consumer surveys in unregistered trade dress infringement
action).
74. See, e.g., L.A. Gear, Inc. v. Thom McAn Shoe Co., 12 U.S.P.Q2d (BNA) 1001, 1009
(S.D.N.Y. 1989) (recognizing that intentional copying provides strong support for finding of
secondary meaning). But see Coach Leatherware, 933"F.2d at 169, 18 U.S.P.Q2d (BNA) at 1913
(holding that "conscious replication" is not sufficient to establish secondary meaning).
75. See, e.g., Aloe Creme Lab., Inc. v. Milson, Inc., 423 F.2d 845, 850, 165 U.S.P.Q.
(BNA) 37, 41 (5th Cir.) (finding large expenditure of $3,000,000 on national media and local
promotions probative of secondary meaning), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 928 (1970). But see Smith v.
Chanel, Inc., 402 F.2d 562, 568, 159 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 388, 393 (9th Cir. 1968) (stating that
large expenditure of money does not in itself create legally protectible rights). For advertis-
ing to be probative of secondary meaning, it must feature the trade dress in some way. See
Textron, Inc. v. United States Int'l Trade Comm'n, 753 F.2d 1019, 1027, 224 U.S.P.Q. (BNA)
625, 631 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (holding that advertisements must focus buyer's attention on fea-
ture at issue). Moreover, in weighing the value of advertisement evidence, the focus is on the
effectiveness of the promotion, not its extent. Aloe Creme Lab., 423 F.2d at 850, 165 U.S.P.Q.
(BNA) at 41.
76. See, e.g., LeSportsac, Inc. v. K Mart Corp., 754 F.2d 71, 78, 225 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 654,
659 (2d Cir. 1985) (finding that "phenomenal sales success" in conjunction with other evi-
dence proved secondary meaning); Aloe Creme Lab., 423 F.2d at 850, 165 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 41
(noting that plaintiff's product had acquired secondary meaning in part by winning nation-
wide market of "discriminating consumers"); Morgan Creek Prods., Inc. v. Capital Cities/
ABC, Inc., 22 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1881, 1889 (C.D. Cal. 1991) (holding that plaintiff estab-
lished sales success and showed evidence of secondary meaning). But see Spraying Sys. Co. v.
Delavan, Inc., 975 F.2d 387, 393, 24 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1181, 1186 (7th Cir. 1992) (holding
that evidence of sales is circumstantial and often insufficient to prove secondary meaning).
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exclusivity of use;77 and (6) unsolicited media coverage. 781 No single
factor is dispositive on the issue of secondary meaning,79 nor need
every factor support a finding of secondary meaning.80 It is only
necessary that the party claiming trade dress protection show that a
substantial segment of the relevant group of consumers made the
requisite association between product and producer.8 '
Despite the many means available to prove secondary meaning, a
recent market entrant may have difficulty proving secondary mean-
ing to the satisfaction of a court.8 2 If, for example, a producer's
trade dress is copied at the start of its market life, the producer
could increase its advertising budget in the hope of attaining con-
sumer recognition.8 3 At the same time, however, the competition
may prevent the original producer from attaining such recognition
by virtue of its imitation.8 4
Furthermore, courts have judicial discretion in how they will ap-
ply secondary meaning factors to the case at bar. As a result, it be-
77. See, e.g., Morgan Creek Prods., 22 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1886 (stating that length and
continuity of use are relevant indicia for determining secondary meaning). But see Eldon In-
dus., Inc. v. Rubbermaid, Inc., 735 F. Supp. 786 app. at 817 (N.D. Ill. 1990) (stating that
length of use alone is not dispositive of secondary meaning). While § 2() of the Lanham Act
requires five years of continuous use for a descriptive mark to acquire distinctiveness and
registrability, 15 U.S.C. § 1052(f) (1988), courts have not articulated such an exact standard
for secondary meaning. See, e.g., Centaur Communications, Ltd. v. A/S/M Communications,
Inc., 830 F.2d 1217, 1225, 4 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1541, 1547 (2d Cir. 1987) (rioting that "no
absolute time span can be posited as a yardstick in cases involving secondary meaning"); see
also Braun Inc. v. Dynamics Corp., 975 F.2d 815, 826, 24 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1121, 1131 (Fed.
Cir.- 1992) (holding that 18 months is rarely long enough time span to establish secondary
meaning); LA. Gear, 12 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1010 (recognizing that five months is sufficient
time to develop secondary meaning).
78. See, e.g., Harlequin Enters. Ltd. v. Gulf & Western Corp., 644 F.2d 946, 950, 210
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 1, 3 (2d Cir. 1981) (finding unsolicited media coverage of consumers' "enthu-
siasm and loyalty" for products probative of secondary meaning).
79. See Thompson Medical Co. v. Pfizer Inc., 753 F.2d 208, 217, 225 U.S.P.Q (BNA)
124, 132 (2d Cir. 1985) (elaborating on factors to be considered and concluding that each
case "must be resolved by reference to relevant factual calculus"); Zatarain's, Inc. v. Oak
Grove Smokehouse, Inc., 698 F.2d 786, 795, 217 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 988, 997 (5th Cir. 1983)
(stating that link between product and source may come from combination of sources).
80. Thompson Medical, 753 F.2d at 217, 225 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 132.
81. Centaur Communications, 830 F.2d at 1222, 4 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1545; cf. First
Brands Corp. v. Fred Myer, Inc., 809 F.2d 1378, 1383, 1 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1779, 1782 (9th
Cir. 1987) ("The test of secondary meaning is the effectiveness of the effort to create it.").
82. See, e.g., Perfect Fit Indus., Inc. v. Acme Quilting Co., 484 F. Supp. 643, 645-46, 203
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 481, 483 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (finding that four months is not long enough to
establish secondary meaning, despite showing of advertising expenditures and product popu-
larity), rev'd on other grounds, 618 F.2d 950 (2d Cir. 1980).
83. See Smith v. Chanel, Inc., 402 F.2d 562, 568, 159 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 388, 393 (9th Cir.
1968) (stating that large expenditure of money does not in itself create legally protectible
rights).
84. See Bauer, supra note 6, at 714-15 (positing that it is unfair for courts to require
market entrant to continue efforts at achieving secondary meaning in face of imitation that
only serves to confuse consumers); Webb, supra note 5, at 15 (noting that "an intentional
copier can pull the rug out from under a prospective trademark owner who is in the process of
acquiring secondary meaning").
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comes more difficult for producers to acquire protection because
uncertainty exists as to what factors will lead a court to find that
trade dress has secondary meaning.8 5 For example, some courts
employ a presumption of secondary meaning where the second
manufacturer has deliberately and closely copied the trade dress of
the first.86 Other courts, however, do not employ such a presump-
tion.8 7 Additionally, consumer surveys used to prove secondary
meaning are also subject to inconsistent judicial interpretation. 88
Such judicial inconsistencies result in a burden of proving secon-
dary meaning that is not only onerous, but also costly. 89
4. Likelihood of confusion
A finding of nonfunctionality and inherent distinctiveness or sec-
ondary meaning does not in itself guarantee protection of a prod-
uct's trade dress.90 Under section 43(a) of the Lanham Act, the
ultimate test of unfair competition is the same as for trademark in-
fringement: whether the purchasing public is unlikely to determine
the source of the goods or is likely to be misled or confused by the
similarity of the goods.9' That is, a producer must also show that a
likelihood of confusion exists between the product and its
85. See American Footwear Corp. v. General Footwear Co., 609 F.2d 655, 663, 204
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 609, 615 (2d Cir. 1979) (noting that secondary meaning is difficult to prove in
that "no precise guidelines are applicable and... [e]ach case must, therefore, be decided on
its facts").
86. See, e.g., M. Kramer Mfg. Co. v. Andrews, 783 F.2d 421, 428, 228 U.S.P.Q. (BNA)
705, 724 (4th Cir. 1986) (finding that evidence of intentional copying is sufficient to support
presumption of secondary meaning, thereby shifting burden of persuasion from plaintiff to
defendant on secondary meaning issue).
87. See, e.g., Schwinn Bicycle Co. v. Ross Bicycles, Inc., 870 F.2d 1176, 1183, 10
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1001, 1007 (7th Cir. 1989) (noting that in Seventh Circuit, proof of inten-
tional copying is only probative evidence of secondary meaning); see also Timothy Bryant,
Comment, Trademark Infringement: The Irrelevance of Evidence of Copying to Secondary Meaning, 83
Nw. U. L. REv. 473, 487-511 (1989) (arguing that issue of intentional copying is irrelevant and
incompatible with basic premise of secondary meaning).
88. See supra note 73 (citing cases interpreting use of consumer surveys differently in
secondary meaning determinations); see also Palladino, supra note 69, at 404 (explaining that
"designing [survey) questions to measure secondary meaning is difficult .... fraught with
uncertainty and likely to be less than entirely successful"); Comment, Lack of Uniformity in
Determining Secondary Meaning, 47 IowA L. REV. 781, 784-85 (1962) (discussing "barriers to the
use of surveys" as proof of secondary meaning and inconsistent weight given to consumer
surveys by courts on issue of secondary meaning).
89. See Gaske, supra note 71, at 1135-37 (stating that proof of secondary meaning results
in heavy burden that is costly, particularly considering expense of surveys).
90. See Sicilia Di R. Biebow & Co. v. Cox, 732 F.2d 417,425 (5th Cir. 1984) (stating that
questions of functionality, distinctiveness, and secondary meaning compose only first part of
trade dress analysis).
91. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1988); MCCARTHY, supra note 1, §§ 8:3-:4, at 287-93; see also
Century 21 Real Estate Corp. v. Sandlin, 846 F.2d 1175, 1178; 6 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 2034,
2035 (9th Cir. 1988) (holding that defendant's former franchisee's use of name "Century" in
his new business was unfair competition and trademark infringement).
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competition.92
As in the determination of the existence of secondary meaning, 93
courts look to various factors considered generally important in de-
termining the issue of confusing similarity.94 The factors most com-
monly used by the courts include similarity of the goods, classes of
prospective buyers, actual consumer confusion, and the intent of the
defending competitor. 95 These factors, however, are merely a guide
in determining whether confusion would be likely. 96
Courts have discretion in weighing these various factors. 97 Some
courts appear to view all the factors as being important in a determi-
nation of likelihood of confusion,98 while others weigh some factors
92. Sicilia Di R. Biebow, 732 F.2d at 425.
93. See supra notes 60-89 and accompanying text (discussing secondary meaning). The
circuits, however, are split regarding the relationship between the tests for proof of secondary
meaning and that of likelihood of confusion. The Ninth Circuit holds that a finding of no
secondary meaning renders moot further determination on the issue of likelihood of confu-
sion. Levi Strauss & Co. v. Blue Bell, Inc., 778 F.2d 1352, 1359, 228 U.S.P.Q, (BNA) 346, 351
(9th Cir. 1985). The Second Circuit disagrees and holds that a finding of likelihood of confu-
sion as to source does not include an implicit finding of secondary meaning. 20th Century
Wear, Inc. v. Sanmark-Stardust, Inc., 747 F.2d 81, 90 n.10, 224 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 98, 103 n.10
(2d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1052 (1985).
94. Cf RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 729 (1938) (setting forth four factors for determining
likelihood of confusion). The four factors set forth in the Restatement are as follows:
(a) the degree of similarity between the designation and the trade-mark or
tradename in
(i) appearance;
(ii) pronunciation of the words used;
(iii) verbal translation of the pictures or designs involved;
(iv) suggestion;
(b) the intent of the actor in adopting the designation;
(c) the relation in use and manner of marketing between the goods or services mar-
keted by the actor and those marketed by the other; and
(d) the degree of care likely to be exercised by purchasers.
Id. Circuit courts have expanded upon the Restatement's factors and have adopted their own
factors. See, e.g., Pizzeria Uno Corp. v. Temple, 747 F.2d 1522, 1527, 224 U.S.P.Q(BNA) 185,
187 (4th Cir. 1984) (stating seven-factor test); Scott Paper Co. v. Scott's Liquid Gold, Inc.,
589 F.2d 1225, 1229, 200 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 421,425 (3d Cir. 1978) (discussing ten-factor test);
Polaroid Corp v. Polarad Elecs. Corp., 287 F.2d 492, 495, 128 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 411, 413 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 820 (1961) (listing eight variables in determining "prior owner's
chance of success").
95. See Schwinn Bicycle Co. v. Ross Bicycles, Inc., 870 F.2d 1176, 1183-85, 10
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1001, 1006-09 (7th Cir. 1989) (setting forth various factors relevant to test
of confusion and holding that evidence of deliberate copying does not give rise to presump-
tion of confusion but rather is only one factor bearing on issue); see also Schuman, supra note 2,
at 781-86 (discussing court's determination of likelihood of confusion vis-i-vis trademark pro-
tection of containers and package configurations).
96. See Wynn Oil Co. v. Thomas, 839 F.2d 1183, 1186, 5 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1944, 1946
(6th Cir. 1988) (holding that factors are flexible guide to help determine likelihood of
confusion).
97. Schwinn Bicycle, 870 F.2d at 1184, 10 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1007-08.
98. See, e.g., Thompson Medical Co. v. Pfizer, Inc., 753 F.2d 208, 214, 225 U.S.P.O,
(BNA) 124, 129 (2d Cir. 1985) ("The wisdom of the likelihood of confusion test lies in its
recognition that each trademark infringement case presents its own unique set of facts... No
single ... factor is pre-eminent, nor can the presence or absence of one without analysis of
the others, determine the outcome of an infringement suit.").
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more heavily than others.99 In general, the complainant need not
show that all, or even most, of the factors tested are present in any
particular case to be successful. 100
II. SECONDARY MEANING IN THE MAKING
A. The Birth
As discussed, there are intrinsic difficulties in proving secondary
meaning. These difficulties and the inherent judicial discretion in-
volved in applying the various factors that comprise a secondary
meaning determination probably led to the judicial substitution of
the incipient secondary meaning doctrine, also known as secondary
meaning in the making, for that of secondary meaning. 10 1
The origin of secondary meaning in the making, according to
trademark scholar Rudolf Callman, 10 2 was the 1925 patent infringe-
ment and unfair competition case of Edward G. Budd Manufacturing
Co. v. C.R. Wilson Body Co. 103 In Budd, the plaintiff filed suit to enjoin
Wilson Body's use of the words ALL-STEEL to market its steel au-
tomobile bodies.10 4 The court restrained Wilson Body's use of the
words, notwithstanding Budd Manufacturing's failure to prove that
the words had secondary meaning. 10 5 In its opinion, the court held
that allowing Wilson Body to use the words ALL-STEEL on its
goods or in its advertising might create a "great injustice" to Budd
Manufacturing, which had been the first user of the term.10 6
99. See, e.g., Ziebart Int'l Corp. v. After Market Assocs., Inc., 802 F.2d 220, 226, 231
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 119, 124 (7th Cir. 1986) (finding that three factors, similarity of marks, intent
of infringer, and evidence of actual confusion, are most important in determining likelihood
of confusion).
100. See Wynn Oil, 839 F.2d at 1186, 5 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1946 (holding that use of
factors imply no mathematical precision). But see Centaur Communications, Ltd. v. A/S/M
Communications, Inc., 830 F.2d 1217, 1219, 4 U.S.P.Q.2d 1541, 1542 (2d Cir. 1987)
(Cardamone, J.) (finding that determination of secondary meaning and likelihood of confu-
sion necessitate considering long list of factors, without recourse to shortcut). In an acerbic
concurrence in Centaur Communications, however, Judge Sprizzo expressed his view that a
proper analysis of these factors could not be "properly characterized as a recital of the 'the
right formulas' akin to Ali Baba's magical incantation." Id. at 1230, 4 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at
1551 (Sprizzo,J., concurring).
101. See Dratler, supra note 41, at 958 n.363 (suggesting that courts turned to doctrine of
secondary meaning in making in effort to "cushion the harshness of denying protection to
trade dress without secondary meaning"). See generally John M. Scagnelli, Dawn of a New Doc-
trine?-Trademark Protection for Incipient Secondary Meaning, 71 TRADEMARK REP. 527, 529-43
(1981) (providing history of incipient secondary meaning).
102. 3 RUDOLPH CALLMAN, THE LAW OF UNFAIR COMPETITION, TRADEMARKS AND MONOPO-
LIES 356 n.38 (3d ed. 1969).
103. 7 F.2d 746 (E.D. Mich. 1925), aff'd, 21 F.2d 803 (6th Cir. 1927), cert. dnied, 276 U.S.
632 (1928).
104. Edward G. Budd Mfg. Co. v. C.R. Wilson Body Co., 7 F.2d 746, 748 (E.D. Mich.
1925), aft'd, 21 F.2d 803 (6th Cir. 1927), cert. denied, 276 U.S. 632 (1928).
105. Id. at 748-49.
106. Il at 749.
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Secondary meaning in the making did not reemerge until 1974 in
National Lampoon, Inc. v. American Broadcasting Cos. 10 7 In that case,
National Lampoon Magazine brought suit against American Broad-
casting Companies to enjoin the use of a portion of its magazine
title, National Lampoon, as a title for a television series.108 The court
found that the magazine had presented "strong evidence" of secon-
dary meaning. 10 9 The court did not stop there, however. It further
suggested in dictum that the magazine might have prevailed even
without a showing of secondary meaning. The court stated:
[A] mark with secondary meaning in the making should also be
protected, at least against those who appropriate it with knowl-
edge or good reason to know of its potential in that regard or with
an intent to capitalize on its quality. "Piracy should no more be
tolerated in the earlier stage of development of quality than in the
later." 110
After its reemergence in the National Lampoon case, the secondary
meaning in the making doctrine was used by plaintiffs over the next
eighteen years with mixed results in the district courts of New
York.111 During that period, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sec-
107. 376 F. Supp. 733, 182 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 24 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 497 F.2d 1343 (2d Cir.
1974). The concept was used in two previous New York state cases, but these do not have any
bearing on the discussion here. See Scagnelli, supra note 101, at 529-43 (discussing develop-
ment of incipient secondary meaning in case law).
108. National Lampoon, Inc. v. American Broadcasting Cos., 376 F. Supp. 733, 738, 182
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 24, 27 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 497 F.2d 1343 (2d Cir. 1974).
109. Id at 746, 182 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 33.
110. Id (quoting 3 RUDOLPH CALLMAN, THE LAW OF UNFAIR COMPETITION, TRADEMARKS
AND MONOPOLIEs 356 (3d ed. 1969)).
111. There are 15 New York district court cases, in addition to National Lampoon, in which
plaintiffs argued with or without success that relief from infringement should be granted
under the doctrine of secondary meaning in the making. See, e.g., American Direct Mktg., Inc.
v. Azad Int'l, Inc., 783 F. Supp. 84, 97, 22 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1108, 1118 (E.D.N.Y. 1992)
(finding that plaintiff had failed to show proof of consumer association between trade dress
and producer under secondary meaning in the making doctrine); EFS Mktg. Inc. v. Russ Ber-
rie & Co., 21 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1993, 1997 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (rejecting argument that doctrine
of secondary meaning in the making supported issuance of preliminary injunction); Laureys-
sens v. Idea Group, Inc., 768 F. Supp. 1036, 1048, 20 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1821, 1830 (S.D.N.Y.
1991) (finding existence of serious question as to whether trade dress should be protected
against "intentional deliberate attempts to capitalize on a distinctive product" under secon-
dary meaning in the making doctrine), rev'd, 964 F.2d 131 (2d Cir. 1992); PAF S.r.l. v. Lisa
Lighting Co., 712 F. Supp. 394, 407, 12 U.S.P.O.2d (BNA) 1161, 1167-68 (S.D.N.Y. 1989)
(stating, in dictum, that secondary meaning in the making is appropriate finding where there
is intentional appropriation of recently introduced distinctive product); L.A. Gear, Inc. v.
Thom McAn Shoe Co., 12 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1001, 1011 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (finding support for
plaintiff's case under secondary meaning in the making doctrine in that defendant deliber-
ately copied plaintiff's successful, distinctive product);Jolly Good Indus., Inc. v. Elegra Inc.,
690 F. Supp. 227, 230-31, 9 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1534, 1536-37 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (finding plain-
tiff's claims under secondary meaning in the making doctrine persuasive); Elizabeth Taylor
Cosmetics Co. v. Annick Goutal, S.A.R.L., 673 F. Supp. 1238, 1244, 5 U.S.P.OQ2d (BNA)
1305, 1313 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (holding secondary meaning in the making entitled product to
protection); Scholastic, Inc. v. Macmillan, Inc., 650 F. Supp. 866, 872 n.3, 2 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1191, 1195 n.3 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (noting that claims based on secondary meaning in the
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ond Circuit never adopted the doctrine.' 12 The Second Circuit did
not explicitly reject the doctrine, however, until 1992.1"3 Outside
the Second Circuit, the doctrine of secondary meaning in the mak-
ing did not attract many followers. 114
Despite the possible positive competitive effects of the doctrine,
the judicial death knell for secondary meaning in the making began
to sound in 1982 when the Eighth Circuit refused to recognize the
doctrine in Black & Decker Manufacturing Co. v. Ever-Ready Appliance
Manufacturing Co. 115 In that case, Black & Decker, the manufacturer
of a foldable step stool, brought action for patent infringement and
violation of the Lanham Act against Ever-Ready Appliance for man-
ufacturing a similar foldable step stool. 1 6 The step stools were vir-
tually identical: "almond in color with black nonskid treads on the
steps," and "black plastic handle[s] on the back of the top step for
making are available, if at all, only against "intentional deliberate attempts to capitalize on a
distinctive product"); Metro Kane Imports, Ltd. v. Federated Dep't Stores Inc., 625 F. Supp.
313, 317, 228 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 761, 763 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (finding that plaintiff's claim of sec-
ondary meaning in the making presented "viable federal question"), aft'd, 800 F.2d 1128 (2d
Cir. 1986); Loctite Corp. v. National Starch & Chem. Corp., 516 F. Supp. 190, 210-11, 211
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 237, 253-54 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (finding that doctrine of secondary meaning in
the making afforded plaintiffs no trademark protection because plaintiffs had not persuasively
shown that their mark had ever been in process of gaining secondary meaning); Black Publish-
ing Corp. v. O'Quinn Studios, Inc., 202 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 848, 856 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (stating
that plaintiff does not necessarily have to show secondary meaning because of growing recog-
nition by courts that secondary meaning in the making deserves protection); Orion Pictures
Co. v. Dell Publishing Co., 471 F. Supp. 392, 396, 202 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 819, 823 (S.D.N.Y.
1979) (stating that had plaintiff not established inference of secondary meaning, secondary
meaning in the making could afford protection); Nature's Bounty, Inc. v. Basic Organics, 432
F. Supp. 546, 552 n.8, 196 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 622, 627 n.8 (E.D.N.Y. 1977) (noting that plain-
tiff's interpretation of secondary meaning in the making was correct, but argument was not
supported by evidence); West & Co. v. Arica Inst., Inc., 194 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 32, 35 n.10
(S.D.N.Y. 1976) (acknowledging that even without showing of secondary meaning, word
PSYCHOCALISTHENICS could be protected under secondary meaning in the making doc-
trine due to evidence of intentional appropriation), aff'd, 557 F.2d 338 (2d Cir. 1977);
Glamorene Prods. Corp. v. Boyle-Midway, Inc., 188 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 145, 165 (S.D.N.Y. 1975)
(holding that others will not be allowed to interfere with mark that is "developing secondary
meaning").
112. See, e.g., Murphy v. Provident Mut. Life Ins. Co., 923 F.2d 923, 929, 17 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1299, 1303 (2d Cir. 1990) (speculating as to whether Second Circuit would ever adopt
doctrine of secondary meaning in the making), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 65 (1991). Judge Sifton
of the Eastern District of New York appears to have read this statement as tacit acceptance of
the doctrine because the Second Circuit "refrained from stating that it would never adopt the
doctrine." American Direct Mktg., 783 F. Supp. at 97, 22 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1118.
113. Laureyssens v. Idea Group, Inc., 964 F.2d 131, 139, 22 U.S.P..2d (BNA) 1811,
1818 (2d Cir. 1992); see infra notes 175-98 and accompanying text (discussing Second Circuit's
rejection of secondary meaning in the making doctrine).
114. See MCCARTHY, supra note 1, § 15:21, at 704-06 (citing only Second Circuit courts as
speaking favorably of secondary meaning in the making doctrine and noting that Eighth Cir-
cuit explicitly rejected doctrine).
115. 684 F.2d 546, 215 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 97 (8th Cir. 1982).
116. Black & Decker Mfg. Co. v. Ever-Ready Appliance Mfg. Co., 684 F.2d 546, 546, 215
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 97, 98 (8th Cir. 1982).
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carrying and hanging the folded stool." 1" 7 The lower court con-
cluded that neither manufacturer had seen the other's product until
they were both unveiled at a hardware show. 118 Black & Decker
urged the court to find that the trade dress of its step stool, the
Stowaway, had secondary meaning in the making based on the com-
pany's marketing attempts." 19 The court refused to find in favor of
Black & Decker. 120 It held that the theory behind secondary mean-
ing in the making improperly "focuse[d] solely upon the intent and
actions of the seller of the product to the exclusion of the consum-
ing public." 121 The essence of secondary meaning, the court noted,
is based on the consumer's association between "particular aspects
of trade dress" and a single product and producer. 122
B. The Scholarly Debate
"[T]here is a notion at large called secondary meaning in the
making. It should be stamped out." 123
The emergence of the doctrine of secondary meaning in the mak-
ing drew primarily negative scholarly and judicial commentary. 124
Furor over the new doctrine arose because secondary meaning was
viewed as the touchstone of the law of unfair competition. 125 For
example, the common law tort of unfair competition has been lim-
ited to protection against copying of nonfunctional aspects of prod-
ucts that have acquired secondary meaning.' 26 Legal scholars
opposed to the doctrine of secondary meaning in the making
117. Id. at 548, 215 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 98.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 550, 215 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 100.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id. The court further noted that all the cases relied on by Black & Decker for a claim
of secondary meaning in the making merely acknowledged the possibility of protection under
the doctrine while finding that secondary meaning existed. Id. at 550 n.5, 215 U.S.P.Q (BNA)
at 100 n.5; see also Scagnelli, supra note 101, at 532-39 (arguing that cases cited as standing for
doctrine of incipient secondary meaning merely discuss doctrine in dicta and decide case on
traditional grounds).
123. Ralph S. Brown, Design Protection: An Overview, 34 UCLA L. REV. 1341, 1374 (1987).
124. See, e.g., Laureyssens v. Idea Group, Inc., 964 F.2d 131, 138, 22 U.S.P.Q2d (BNA)
1811, 1818 (2d Cir. 1992) (holding that doctrine of secondary meaning in the making should
be rejected); Brown, supra note 123, at 1374 (arguing that doctrine should be rejected);
Scagnelli, supra note 101, at 543 (arguing that doctrine is unnecessary); Schuman, supra note
2, at 807 n.22 (noting contradictory precedent and questioning doctrine); Note, Trade Name
Protection: Relaxation of the "Secondary Meaning" Requirement and Its Implications, 1962 DuKE LJ.
307, 316 (arguing that serious consideration should be given to legal and economic implica-
tions before altering secondary meaning requirement).
125. See Brown, supra note 123, at 1374 ("Source identification is still the bedrock of un-
fair competition."); see also Smithkline Beckman Corp. v. Pennex Prods. Co., 605 F. Supp. 746,
750, 225 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 963, 965 (E.D. Pa. 1985) (stating that "[r]ecognition and association
are the cornerstones of secondary meaning.").
126. See Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 158, 9 U.S.P.Q2d
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thought that the doctrine was generally "inimical to the purpose of
... secondary meaning" because it did not focus on consumer asso-
ciation, but rather on the attempts of the producer to acquire con-
sumer association. 127
The inherent problem in applying secondary meaning in the mak-
ing is that no criteria exist for evaluating the evidence that would be
presented by a "wronged" producer. For example, the courts
would have to determine the length of marketing time or the
amount of advertising required before consumer association with
the trade dress could be established. There are no standards avail-
able for the consistent application of the doctrine.' 28 In fact, the
sole judicial guidance provided indicates that the doctrine should
only be applicable in cases where there is deliberate appropria-
tion. 129 If secondary meaning in the making were used without any
fixed standards to determine trade dress infringement, the outcome
of cases would be hard to predict and judicial confusion would re-
sult.' 3 0 Furthermore, because of the different evidence used to
prove secondary meaning, courts would be unlikely to evaluate the
same evidence the same way. l3 '
(BNA) 1847, 1855 (1989) (finding that copying of nonfunctional aspects is protected under
law of unfair competition where nonfunctional elements operate as designation of source).
127. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 13 cmt. e (Tentative Draft No.
2, 1990) (discussing New York court trend and criticizing theory behind secondary meaning in
the making doctrine); see also Black & Decker Mfg. Co. v. Ever-Ready Appliance Mfg. Co., 684
F.2d 546, 550, 215 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 97, 100 (8th Cir. 1982) (discussing secondary meaning
doctrine and logical necessity of doctrine's requirement of public association of product to
producer).
128. See Scagnelli, supra note 101, at 543 (arguing against application of secondary mean-
ing in the making because of doctrine's lack of standards).
129. Scagnelli, supra note 101, at 543; see National Lampoon, Inc. v. American Broadcast-
ing Cos., 376 F. Supp. 733, 746, 182 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 24, 33 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) (holding ABC
liable under secondary meaning in the making doctrine where facts showed deliberate intent
to imitate). On the other hand, deliberate appropriation both raises an inference that the
market entrant has achieved secondary meaning and obviates the need to examine why the
second entrant might copy the plaintiff's dress, such as the second entrant reasonably believ-
ing that the dress is functional. See Bryant, supra note 87, at 495-502 (arguing that evidence of
copying is not relevant to establishment of secondary meaning).
130. See Note, supra note 124, at 317 n.55 (claiming that all businesses will suffer from
confusion in atmosphere of uncertainty caused by relaxation of secondary meaning
standards).
131. See Note, supra note 124, at 317 (suggesting that secondary meaning test provides
more predictability than would "incipient secondary meaning" application). The same argu-
ment can be and has been made about the factors used to prove secondary meaning. See
American Scientific Chem., Inc. v. American Hosp. Supply Corp., 690 F.2d 791, 792, 216
U.S.P.Q.(BNA) 1080, 1081 (9th Cir. 1982) (claiming that although numerous cases determin-
ing secondary meaning exist, no consensus on secondary meaning's elements has been
reached); Bryant, supra note 87, at 474 n.8 (noting that "[the] Lanham Act provides little
guidance for the evidence required to prove secondary meaning .... [and] judicial discretion
has filled the gap"). For a discussion of the types of factors generally used in proving secon-
dary meaning, see Gaske, supra note 71, at 1135-37 (citing factors including market survey
data, sales or advertising data, and evidence of imitation).
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Another concern is that the application of incipient secondary
meaning could encourage courts to become regulators of the mar-
ketplace.' 3 2 Rather than letting the market take its course and en-
suring that the fittest survive, the doctrine would encourage courts
to substitute their attitudes and biases when called upon to discour-
age imitation or free-riding by the second producer. 133 The ab-
sence of any guideposts could fuel unprincipled decisions without
contributing any greater judicial flexibility than is already provided
under traditional concepts of unfair competition law.' 3 4 In fact, re-
laxation of secondary meaning standards might lead to the creation
of a monopoly without the attendant safeguards that are built into
the statutory monopolies of patents and copyrights.' 3 5 In applying
the doctrine of secondary meaning in the making, courts would
more readily grant protection for product designs that otherwise
would not be protectible.' 3 6
On the other hand, it has been argued that requiring an entrant to
prove secondary meaning could destroy the incentives necessary to
develop valuable informational devices. 137 While waiting for secon-
dary meaning to develop, a producer is faced with the possibility
that another will appropriate his or her idea. Understandably, a
producer who knows that his or her trade dress may be copied as
soon as it is introduced on the market is less likely to invest the
capital and energy in creating new trade dress.' 38
One of the arguments in favor of the incipient secondary meaning
doctrine is that such a doctrine protects market incentives.' 39 The
protection of trade dress likely to acquire secondary meaning en-
courages producers to devote significant amounts of money in re-
132. See Note, supra note 124, at 317 (arguing that incipient meaning doctrine greatly in-
creases involvement of courts in market relationships).
133. Note, supra note 124, at 317.
134. See Scagnelli, supra note 101, at 528 (arguing that undeveloped doctrine of secondary
meaning in the making confuses doctrine of secondary meaning unnecessarily).
135. See Brown, supra note 123, at 1378 (arguing that patent and copyright laws were
written so as to prevent creation of monopolies, but that judiciary might create monopolies
under incipient secondary meaning doctrine).
136. See Brown, supra note 123, at 1378 (asserting as example that novelty requirement for
design patents could be avoided through incipient secondary meaning doctrine).
137. Cf William Landes & Richard Posner, Trademark Law: An Economic Perspective, 30J. L.
& ECON. 265, 270 (1987) (stating that free-riding eventually destroys good will based on
trademark and that prospect of free-riding may eliminate incentive to develop valuable
trademark).
138. See Mims, supra note 33, at 662 ("[I]f firms know... trade dress can be copied upon
first use-before secondary meaning could develop ... they may balk at investing in it.").
139. See Andrew B. Smith, Comment, Trademark Law: Equity's Role in Unfair Competition
Cases, 13 U. HAW. L. REv. 137, 173 (1991) (finding that incipient secondary meaning doctrine
rewards creativity and fosters competition by protecting producers from bad-faith competi-
tors); cf Landes & Posner, supra note 137, at 265 (providing extensive economic analysis of
trademark law).
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search and development to create new trade dress. Knowledge that
trade dress is protected, early on, from poachers frees creativity. In
a protective atmosphere, which results from relaxing the strict re-
quirements necessary for proof of secondary meaning, producers
will more readily develop new trade dress. 140
Relaxation of the secondary meaning requirements should not
have a chilling effect on the market, but rather should help to elicit
new product designs and foster competition, 14' particularly consid-
ering that properties of trade dress include a product's size, shape,
color, or color combinations. 142 Any anticompetitive effects that
may be created by the protection of trade dress are minimal because
others are not precluded from entering the market' 43-they have a
virtually unlimited source from which they can choose. 144 Variety in
trade dress is thus encouraged and the value of the trade dress is
increased. 145 Furthermore, application of the secondary meaning in
the making doctrine makes it less likely that the consumer will con-
fuse the source of product "y" with the source of product "z' be-
cause the confusingly similar trade dress would have been
eliminated from the market. Thus, an inflexible insistence on proof
of certain criteria for secondary meaning in trade dress infringe-
ment cases seems without merit.1 46
A few legal commentators find merit in the doctrine of secondary
meaning in the making because application of the doctrine has posi-
tive effects. 147 The protection from competitors encourages produ-
140. See Schuman, supra note 2, at 779-81 (arguing that marketing is key to product devel-
opment and sales and that incipient secondary meaning doctrine protects marketing efforts).
141. See, e.g., Gifford, supra note 5, at 786 (arguing that greater trade dress protection
"creates incentives for sellers to design creatively"). But see Smith, supra note 139, at 172
(arguing that application of secondary meaning in the making may frustrate healthy
competition).
142. See Bauer, supra note 6, at 714 (observing that trade dress may be found without
relying on producer's use of particular words).
143. See Mims, supra note 33, at 661 (stating that products that differ only on aesthetic
basis will compete on equal footing in market).
144. See Perfect Fit Indus. v. Acme Quilting Co., 618 F.2d 950, 953, 205 U.S.P.Q. (BNA)
297, 300 (2d Cir. 1980) (finding that monopolization is not problem in trade dress area be-
cause possible varieties of advertising, display, and packaging are virtually endless), cert. de-
nied, 459 U.S. 832 (1982). But see Stephen L. Carter, The Trouble with Trademark, 99 YALE LJ.
759, 787 (1990) (claiming that legal system allowing producers to gain trademark protection
without making initial investment in good will risks reducing supply of superior marks without
any corresponding benefit to public).
145. Perfect Fit Indus., 618 F.2d at 953, 205 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 300.
146. See Bauer, supra note 6, at 713-14 (arguing that "insistence on strong proof of secon-
dary meaning in all cases of unauthorized imitation of trademarks or trade symbols is
misguided").
147. See, e.g., Bauer, supra note 6, at 712 n.180f (arguing that Lanham Act protection
should be available for "evolving" consumer association of trade dress with particular prod-
uct); Pegram, supra note 23, at 26 (supporting secondary meaning in the making by arguing
that gap of time prior to acquisition of secondary meaning often prevents creation of secon-
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cers to create a niche for themselves, provides incentives for them to
expend the resources necessary to develop creative and attractive
products, 148 and leads to a lessening of consumer confusion. Argu-
ments for increased recognition of the incipient secondary meaning
doctrine were not persuasive, however, and two judgments that fol-
lowed the Eighth Circuit's decision in Black & Decker were decisive in
the decline of the doctrine.149
C. The Death
1. The Federal Circuit decision
After Black & Decker, the doctrine of secondary meaning in the
making received two death blows, one from the Federal Circuit and
one from the Second Circuit. In a case before the Federal Circuit,
Cicena Ltd. v. Columbia Telecommunications Group,' 50 both parties man-
ufactured and sold clear plastic neon-lit telephones. 151 Cicena
brought suit against Columbia Telecommunications for unfair com-
petition under New York state law and section 43(a) of the Lanham
Act, as well as for design patent infringement.'5 2 The U.S. District
Court for the Southern District of New York granted Cicena a pre-
liminary injunction under section 43(a) of the Lanham Act, but re-
fused to consider either design patent infringement or state unfair
competition law claims. 153
The Federal Circuit, using Second Circuit law, reviewed the grant
of the preliminary injunction by the district court. 154 The court ex-
dary meaning); Webb, supra note 5, at 15 (supporting secondary meaning in the making doc-
trine in light of fact that requirement of proof of secondary meaning for new owner can be
particularly unfair).
148. Schuman, supra note 2, at 779-81.
149. See infra notes 150-98 and accompanying text (discussing Federal Circuit and Second
Circuit opinions rejecting doctrine).
150. 900 F.2d 1546, 14 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1401 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
151. Cicena Ltd. v. Columbia Telecommunications Group, 900 F.2d 1546, 1548, 14
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1401, 1403-04 (Fed. Cir. 1990). The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit was established in 1982. While the court has exclusive jurisdiction over appeals of
patent cases, it does not have exclusive appellate jurisdiction over unfair competition and
trademark matters. See id. (explaining limitation on court's appellate jurisdiction). The Fed-
eral Circuit shares its jurisdiction with other courts. Although decisions of the Federal Circuit
in trademark and unfair competition law are not binding, the court's influence is nonetheless
powerful, and its decisions are treated as persuasive. See generally American Direct Mktg., Inc.
v. Azad Int'l, Inc., 783 F. Supp. 84, 97, 22 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1108, 1118 (E.D.N.Y. 1992)
(noting that concept of secondary meaning in the making was rejected by Federal Circuit and
concluding that although Federal Circuit "has special expertise in such matters.... [its] deci-
sion is not binding authority").
152. Cicena, 900 F.2d at 1548, 14 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1403.
153. Id The district court opinion is unpublished. The Federal Circuit had jurisdiction
over the appeal due to the design patent infringement claim. Id.
154. Id., 14 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1403-04. In deciding unfair competition appeals from
district court cases, the Federal Circuit applies the law of the circuit in which the district court
is located to avoid forum shopping and "to avoid exacerbating the problem of intercircuit
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plained that according to the Second Circuit, the plaintiff must show
that its trade dress had acquired secondary meaning in order to pre-
vail on a theory of trade dress infringement under section 43(a). 155
If the plaintiff could not prove that the public had come to associate
its trade dress with the source or producer, known or unknown,
rather than with the product, then protection was unavailable under
section 43(a).156
In Cicena, however, the district court did not explicitly find evi-
dence of secondary meaning; rather, it found secondary meaning in
the making. 157 Noting this finding, the Federal Circuit explained
that the Second Circuit had never explicitly disavowed (or accepted)
the doctrine of secondary meaning in the making, nor had it ren-
dered an opinion on the doctrine's merits. 158 Thus, the Federal Cir-
cuit found itself "in the delicate position of deciding a question of
first impression in the Second Circuit."'159 The Federal Circuit con-
cluded that the Second Circuit would reject the doctrine of secon-
dary meaning in the making.' 60 The Federal Circuit was correct.
1 61
In arriving at its conclusion, the Federal Circuit narrowly con-
strued the text of section 43(a) of the Lanham Act as protecting
trademark and trade dress only against false designation of ori-
gin.162 From its analysis of the text, the court reasoned, circularly,
conflicts in non-patent areas." Sun Studs, Inc. v. Applied Theory Assocs., 772 F.2d 1557,
1561, 227 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 81, 83 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
155. Cicena, 900 F.2d at 1548, 14 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1404. This is no longer a correct
statement of the law. See Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 112 S. Ct. 2753, 2758-61, 23
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1081, 1084-86 (1992) (holding that proof of secondary meaning is not
required under § 43(a) of Lanham Act in cases where trade dress is inherently distinctive);
infra notes 200-49 and accompanying text (discussing Two Pesos).
156. Cicena, 900 F.2d at 1549, 14 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1404. The decisions of the district
court and Federal Circuit were based on the text of § 43(a) of the Lanham Act prior to its
amendment by the Trademark Law Revision Act of 1988. Id. at 1549 n.1, 14 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) at 1404 n.1; seesupra note 6 (quoting text of § 43(a) in its pre-1988 and current forms).
157. Cicena, 900 F.2d at 1549, 14 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1404.
158. Id. at 1550, 14 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1404.
159. Id., 14 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1405.
160. Id.
161. See Laureyssens v. Idea Group, Inc., 964 F.2d 131, 138-39, 22 U.S.P.O.2d (BNA)
1811, 1818 (2d Cir. 1992) (rejecting doctrine of secondary meaning in the making two years
after Federal Circuit decision in Cicena); infra notes 175-98 and accompanying text (discussing
Laureyssens).
162. Cicena Ltd. v. Columbia Telecommunications Group, 900 F.2d 1546, 1550, 14
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1401, 1405 (Fed. Cir. 1990); see supra note 6 (quoting pre-1988 version of
§ 43(a) of Lanham Act). The Federal Circuit probably did not consider this case under the
"false description or representation" provision of the pre-1988 version of the Lanham Act
because Second Circuit case law only interpreted the "false designation of origin" provision
as being applicable to trade dress. See Cicena, 900 F.2d at 1550 n.4, 14 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at
1405 (restating Second Circuit law); see also LeSportsac, Inc. v. K Mart Corp., 754 F.2d 71, 75,
225 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 654, 656 (2d Cir. 1985) (holding that § 43(a) provides relief against
"false designation of origin" and that trade dress may be eligible for such relief if" 'competi-
tor's product design or package ... falsely designates its origin' ") (quoting 20th Century
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that if there was no consumer association, that is, no secondary
meaning, then there could be no false designation of origin. 163
That is, a consumer must recognize that the telephone is made by
Cicena before he can be confused by a similar phone originating
from Columbia Telecommunications. 164 If there was no false
designation of origin, then there was no violation of the Lanham Act
or trade dress infringement by the defendant.' 6 5
The court then addressed the issue of whether Cicena's telephone
had acquired secondary meaning. Although Cicena proffered evi-
dence of sales success, advertising expenditures, and unsolicited
media coverage, all of which are criteria for determining secondary
meaning, 16 6 the court found that there was not enough evidence to
conclude that the trade dress had secondary meaning. 167 The court
also noted that no consumer surveys were offered as evidence to
link the Cicena telephone with its source. 168 These factors, coupled
with the limited amount of time that the product had been on the
market, weighed against a finding of secondary meaning.' 69 Ac-
cordingly, the Federal Circuit vacated the preliminary injunction.' 70
Having concluded that secondary meaning was a prerequisite to a
section 43(a) claim, the court rejected Cicena's argument that it was
in the process of acquiring secondary meaning.' 71 The court ac-
knowledged that the goal of secondary meaning in the making,
"preventing a deliberate copier from capitalizing on the efforts of
the first producer," was an admirable one. 172 Agreeing with the
Eighth Circuit, the court stated that granting a plaintiff protection
on the theory of secondary meaning in the making would destroy
the very foundation of the secondary meaning requirement: public
Wear, Inc. v. Sanmark-Stardust, Inc., 747 F.2d 81, 93, 224 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 98, 104-05 (2d Cir.
1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1052 (1985)).
163. Cicena, 900 F.2d at 1550, 14 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1405.
164. This is because consumer association and likelihood of confusion are such closely-
related concepts that they "collapse into one another in trade dress cases." CharlesJacquin et
Cie, Inc. v. Destileria Serralles, 921 F.2d 467, 472 n.5, 17 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1104, 1108 n.5
(3d Cir. 1990).
165. Cicena, 900 F.2d at 1550, 14 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1405; see Thompson Medical Co. v.
Pfizer Inc., 753 F.2d 208, 216, 225 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 124, 130 (2d Cir. 1985) ("In the absence
of secondary meaning, however, there will be no [producer] association in the minds of the
purchasing public.").
166. See supra notes 72-81 and accompanying text (discussing various factors relevant for
determining existence of secondary meaning).
167. Cicena, 900 F.2d at 1551, 14 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1406.
168. Id. at 1552, 14 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1407.
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Id. at 1550, 14 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1405.
172. Id
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association of product to source.' 7 3 Therefore, the court held that
such a goal surpassed the scope of section 43(a) of the Lanham
Act. 174
2. The Second Circuit decision
Two years after the Federal Circuit's "delicate" pronounce-
ment, 175 the Second Circuit also rejected the doctrine of secondary
meaning in the making in a trade dress action under the Lanham
Act.' 76 In Laureyssens v. Idea Group, Inc. ,177 one of the issues before
the court was the alleged trade dress infringement of an interlocking
foam rubber puzzle.' 78 The (plaintiff) Laureyssens' puzzles, mar-
keted under the name HAPPY CUBE, came in six colors: yellow,
green, purple, orange, blue, and red.' 79 The puzzles were packaged
for sale in flat assembled form in a clear plastic shrink wrap with a
cardboard insert.' 80 The name HAPPY CUBE was imprinted on the
insert against a black background with the word HAPPY colored in
one of the puzzle colors.' 8 ' The word CUBE was in blue.'8 2
The (defendant) Idea Group's puzzles, SNAFOOZ, were also in-
terlocking foam rubber puzzles.' 8 3 The puzzles were marketed in
the same colors as HAPPY CUBE' 8 4 and were also assembled in flat
173. Id.
174. L- The court admitted, however, that the modifications of § 43(a) by the Trademark
Law Revision Act of 1988 changed the scope of that section. Id. at 1550 n.7, 14 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) at 1405 n.7. See generally Carver, supra note 6, at 146-49 (discussing impact of Trade-
mark Law Revision Act of 1988 on § 43(a) of Lanham Act).
175. See Cicena Ltd. v. Columbia Telecommunications Group, 900 F.2d 1546, 1550, 14
U.S.P.Q2d (BNA) 1401, 1405 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (characterizing court's position as "delicate").
176. Laureyssens v. Idea Group, Inc., 964 F.2d 131, 138-39, 22 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1811,
1818 (2d Cir. 1992). The Second Circuit had previously intimated that it might follow the
lead of the Federal Circuit in Murphy v. Provident Mut. Life Ins. Co., 17 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1299, 1304 (2d Cir. 1990). In Murphy, however, the Second Circuit found that the facts did
not compel adoption of the doctrine. Id. at 1304. The Second Circuit also declined to adopt
the doctrine in Lang v. Retirement Living Publishing Co., 949 F.2d 576, 581, 21 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1041, 1045 (2d Cir. 1991).
177. 964 F.2d 131, 22 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1811 (2d Cir. 1992).
178. Laureyssens v. Idea Group, Inc., 964 F.2d 131, 132, 22 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1811,
1813 (2d Cir. 1992).
179. Id. at 133, 22 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1813. Each of the puzzles was named for a major
city and color-coded accordingly. For example, purple was Brussels, and red was Paris. Id.
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. Id. at 134, 22 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1814. The Idea Group's puzzles had edges that
were six notches long. Id. at 134, 22 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1814. The plaintiff's puzzles were
five notches long. Id. at 133, 22 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1813. Both could be assembled flat or
upright in cube form. Id. at 141, 22 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1820.
184. Id. at 135, 22 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1815. The defendant claimed that it had at-
tempted to use "hot" neon colors, but that these did not meet child-safety toxicity specifica-
tions. Id.
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form and wrapped in shrink wrap.18 5 The cardboard insert featured
the name SNAFOOZ across the top in rainbow-colored lettering
against a black background.' 86
The district court granted Laureyssens a preliminary injunction
for trade dress infringement under section 43 (a) of the Lanham Act
and under New York common law of unfair competition.' 8 7 The
court found that the similarities of packaging raised a serious ques-
tion about trade dress protection under the doctrine of incipient
secondary meaning.'8 8 The Second Circuit reviewed the district
court's decision and analyzed the text of section 43(a).' 89 The court
concluded that the text limited causes of action based on source
confusion or deception to situations involving a "word, term, name,
symbol, or device or combinations thereof."' 190 Thus, where there
was no consumer association of the trade dress to its source, i.e., no
secondary meaning, there would not be confusion, mistake, or de-
ception as to the origin or sponsorship of goods if a second comer
adopted a similar trade dress. 19 1 The Second Circuit, like the Fed-
eral Circuit, found that the second comer's use of imitating dress
was not a false designation of origin under section 43(a) of the Lan-
ham Act where there was no secondary meaning in the first comer's
trade dress. 192
In addition, the Second Circuit made an economic argument
against adopting the doctrine of secondary meaning in the making.
The court argued that granting protection before consumers are
likely to associate the trade dress with a particular producer "con-
strains unnecessarily the freedom to copy and compete."'193 Thus,
for the Second Circuit, unless there is "something worth protect-
ing," that is, the consumer's association between a distinctive trade
185. Id.
186. lad
187. Laureyssens v. Idea Group, Inc., 768 F. Supp. 1036, 1055, 20 U.S.P.Q2d (BNA)
1821, 1836 (S.D.N.Y. 1991), af'd in part, rev'd in part, vacated in part, 964 F.2d 131 (2d Cir.
1992).
188. Id. at 1048, 20 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1030-31.
189. Laureyssens v. Idea Group, Inc., 964 F.2d 131, 136-39, 22 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1811,
1815-18 (2d Cir. 1992). Unlike Cicena, where the Federal Circuit applied the text of the pre-
1988 version of § 43(a), the Second Circuit decision analyzed the 1988 text. Id. at 137, 22
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1816-17. There is nothing to suggest that the outcome would have been
any different had the pre-1988 text been the subject of analysis. See id. at 137-39, 22
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1816-17 (citing both pre-1988 and post-1988 precedent in trade dress
infringement analysis); see also supra note 6 (quoting both versions of § 43(a)).
190. Laureyssens, 964 F.2d at 137, 22 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1816-17.
191. Id.
192. Id.; see also Cicena Ltd. v. Columbia Telecommunications Group, 900 F.2d 1546,
1548-50, 14 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1401, 1403-05 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (discussing insufficiency of
evidence for finding of secondary meaning in the making).
193. Laureyssens, 964 F.2d at 138, 22 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1817.
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dress and its producer, a competitor may copy.' 94
Laureyssens argued on appeal that without the doctrine of secon-
dary meaning in the making producers would be subject to unfair
competition from pirates until their products gained secondary
meaning.' 95 The court disagreed, noting that existing New York
common law affords adequate protection against piracy in the early
stages of product development.' 96 The court also mentioned that
intentional copying is "persuasive evidence of secondary meaning"
and that possibilities exist for the quick development of secondary
meaning.' 97 In essence, the court concluded that innovators under
New York law had adequate recourse in preventing piracy without
resorting to a doctrine considered "inimical" to the tenets of trade-
mark law.' 98
III. THE RENAISSANCE
[A]dding a secondary meaning requirement could have anticom-
petitive effects, creating particular burdens on the start-up of
small companies. 19 9
1. The Supreme Court decision
Although the Federal Circuit's prediction that the Second Circuit
would reject incipient secondary meaning was correct, 20 0 the doc-
trine has risen, seemingly, from the ashes. The Supreme Court deci-
sion in Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc.20 1 has resurrected the
194. Id-
195. Id-
196. Id. at 138-39, 22 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1818.
197. Id. at 138, 22 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1818. But see Cicena Ltd. v. Columbia Telecom-
munications, 900 F.2d 1546, 1551, 14 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1401, 1406 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (hold-
ing that sales and advertising numbers over period of 18 months are not particularly
probative in determining existence of secondary meaning); Bryant, supra note 87, at 494-96
(arguing that copying is not prima fade evidence of secondary meaning).
198. See Laureyssens, 964 F.2d at 138-39, 22 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1818 (holding that New
York unfair competition law provides protection where bad faith may exist); see also RESTATE-
MENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 13 cmt. e (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1990) (discussing New
York court's positions on intentional copying and citing opposing positions held by other
courts).
199. Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 112 S. Ct. 2753, 2761, 23 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1081, 1086 (1992).
200. See supra notes 150-76 and accompanying text (discussing Federal Circuit's decision
in Cicena and relation of case to Second Circuit's subsequent decision in Laureyssens). The
Federal Circuit really had no choice but to predict the demise of the doctrine. The Second
Circuit had steadfastly refused to comment on the validity of the doctrine, Cicena, 900 F.2d at
1550, 14 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1405; the weight ofjudicial opinion was against the doctrine,
id. at 1549, 14 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1404; and the standing requirement of the Second Circuit
in trade dress infringement cases called for proof of secondary meaning. Id. at 1549-50, 14
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1404-05.
201. 112 S. Ct. 2753, 23 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1081 (1992).
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doctrine. The issue in Two Pesos was whether inherently distinctive
dress of a restaurant may be protected under section 43(a) of the
Lanham Act without proof of secondary meaning. 20 2
Taco Cabana and Two Pesos were upscale fast-food Mexican res-
taurants with similar decors, or trade dresses. 203 Taco Cabana's
claimed trade dress was comprised of a festive eating atmosphere
with interior dining and patio areas decorated with artifacts, bright
colors, paintings, and murals. 20 4 The patio could be divided into
interior and exterior areas by using overhead garage doors.20 5 The
exterior of the restaurant was brightly colored with neon stripes.206
Taco Cabana brought suit against Two Pesos in the U.S. District
Court for the Southern District of Texas for trade dress infringe-
ment under the Lanham Act.20 7 The jury found the following in
favor of Taco Cabana's claim: (1) the trade dress was nonfunctional;
(2) the trade dress was inherently distinctive; (3) the trade dress had
not acquired secondary meaning in Texas; and (4) a likelihood of
confusion existed. 208 Judgment was entered for Taco Cabana on
the jury's verdict.20 9
Two Pesos appealed the judgment of the district court. It argued
that the jury had been misled by the district court's instructions on
trade dress. 2 10 The district court told the jury that trade dress was
the total image of the business, which consisted of the shape and
general appearance of the restaurant, and could also include, inter
alia, the decor, menu, or servers' uniforms.2 11 Two Pesos argued
that based on these instructions, the jurors believed that the "total
202. Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 112 S. Ct. 2753, 2755, 23 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1081, 1082 (1992).
203. Id
204. Id
205. Id.
206. Id
207. Taco Cabana Int'l, Inc. v. Two Pesos, Inc., 932 F.2d 1113, 1117, 19 U.S.P.Q2d
(BNA) 1253, 1255 (5th Cir. 1991), aff'd sub nom. Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 112 S.
Ct. 2753 (1992). The district court opinion is unpublished. The Fifth Circuit case will be
referred to in this Article as "Taco Cabana," the Supreme Court decision as "Two Pesos."
Taco Cabana also alleged misappropriation of trade secrets under Texas common law. Id.
The jury found that Two Pesos misappropriated the architectural drawings and kitchen layout
of Taco Cabana. Id., 19 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1256. The issue of misappropriation, however,
is not relevant to the present discussion.
208. Id. at 1117, 19 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1255-56.
209. Id., 19 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1256.
210. Id. at 1118, 19 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1256. Another issue on appeal dealt with a
cross-licensing agreement made by and between Taco Cabana's owners several days prior to
filing the district court case. Id. at 1121-22, 19 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1259. Two Pesos
claimed that this cross-licensing agreement was actually an abandonment of trademark pro-
tection. Id. at 1121, 19 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1259. The circuit court disagreed. Id. The
circuit court also affirmed the jury's finding of misappropriation. Id. at 1125, 19 U.S.P.Qj2d
(BNA) at 1262.
211. Id. at 1118, 19 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1256.
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image" of Taco Cabana included not only the shape and general
appearance of the restaurant, but also the Mexican theme.2 12 These
instructions, Two Pesos argued, would impermissibly allow the ju-
rors to believe that Taco Cabana could preclude a competitor from
appropriating a festive Mexican theme for a Mexican restaurant.213
The Fifth Circuit upheld the jury's findings,214 however, agreeing
that Taco Cabana could not preclude the use of elements of its trade
dress such as Mexican motifs or neon lights, but finding that Taco
Cabana did have the right to preclude a competitor from imitating
its overall look.215
Two Pesos also argued that the Fifth Circuit should distinguish
Taco Cabana's "concept" of its restaurant, the Mexican motif, from
its trade dress-the murals, neon lights, and so forth.2 16 Under
Two Pesos' reasoning, the elements that Taco Cabana claimed were
so distinctive, which were its decorative Mexican elements, were
merely functional.217 Functionality, according to one test, provides
no protection for elements of trade dress that are essential to the
purpose of a product.2 18
The Fifth Circuit disagreed with Two Pesos' argument, however.
The court found that the jury instructions correctly cautioned the
jury against singling out components of Taco Cabana's trade
dress. 219 In addition, established case law provided that distinctive
combinations of functional elements are protectible. 220
212. l
213. Idl
214. Id, 19 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1257.
215. Id., 19 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1256-57.
216. Id, 19 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1256. In its appeal, Two Pesos relied on another restau-
rant case, Prufrock, Ltd. v. Lasater, 781 F.2d 129, 228 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 435 (8th Cir. 1986),
where the circuit court found that the district court had committed error by including the
plaintiff's core concept, its "down-home" country theme, in its definition of trade dress.
Prufrock, 781 F.2d at 132, 228 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 437; see Taco Cabana Int'l, Inc. v. Two Pesos,
Inc., 932 F.2d 1113, 1118, 19 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1253, 1256 (5th Cir. 1991) (noting Two
Pesos' reliance on Prufrock), aff'd sub noma. Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 112 S. Ct.
2753 (1992).
217. Taco Cabana, 932 F.2d at 1118-19, 19 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1257.
218. See W.T. Rogers Co. v. Keene, 778 F.2d 334, 339-40, 228 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 145, 147
(7th Cir. 1985) (finding that if words, symbols, and dress are commercially necessary or pri-
marily attractive, they do not generally merit protection); see also Jerre B. Swann, The Design of
Restaurant Interiors-A New Approach to Aesthetic Functionality, 76 TRADEMARK REP. 408, 408
(1986) (arguing that use of aesthetic functionality may not be appropriate in considering in-
fringement of restaurant interior design).
219. Taco Cabana, 932 F.2d at 1118, 19 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1257.
220. See, e.g., Sicilia Di R. Biebow & Co. v. Cox, 732 F.2d 417,429 (5th Cir. 1984) (holding
that protection may be accorded to distinctive or identifying design, even though that design
is also related to function of product); Chemlawn Servs. Corp. v. GNC Pumps, Inc., 690 F.
Supp. 1560, 1571, 6 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1348, 1356 (S.D. Tex. 1988) (holding that arbitrary
configuration of functional parts may be protected because functional element is separable
from distinctive configuration).
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The Fifth Circuit also used another functionality test, the compet-
itive alternative test, in evaluating Two Pesos' claim that Taco Ca-
bana's trade dress was functional. 22 1 Under this test, if no
alternatives would allow a junior user to compete effectively, then
the senior user's dress is deemed functional and not protectible. 222
According to the Fifth Circuit, a multitude of trade dress alterna-
tives exist in the upscale Mexican fast-food industry. 223 Therefore,
Two Pesos could effectively compete in the Mexican fast-food indus-
try without imitating Taco Cabana's trade dress.2 24
The last argument advanced by Two Pesos before the Fifth Cir-
cuit was that Taco Cabana's trade dress was not inherently distinc-
tive, but instead was descriptive of the type of food served in the
restaurant.225 The thrust of Two Pesos' argument was that a decor
consisting of Mexican artifacts, bright colors, and murals was essen-
tial to a Mexican restaurant.226 According to trademark law, de-
scriptive terms are incapable of serving as indicators of source
unless there is a showing of secondary meaning. 227
The Fifth Circuit again disagreed. According to the court, the
"combination of elements" in Taco Cabana's trade dress prevented
the trade dress from being descriptive, although descriptive ele-
ments were present in the trade dress. 228 Furthermore, the Fifth
Circuit ruled that Taco Cabana need not prove its dress had ac-
quired secondary meaning because the jury had found it to be inher-
221. Taco Cabana, 932 F.2d at 1118-19, 19 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1257; see also Brunswick
Corp. v. Spinit Reel Co., 832 F.2d 513, 519-20, 4 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1497, 1500-01 (10th Cir.
1987) (holding under competitive alternative test that precise shape and configuration of fish-
ing reel's front cover is not competitively essential because cover need not be slavishly copied
for product to be functional); cf Keene Corp. v. Paraflex Indus., 653 F.2d 822, 827, 211
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 201, 205 (3d Cir. 1981) (rejecting competitive alternative test on ground that
it is too narrow).
222. See Taco Cabana Int'l, Inc. v. Two Pesos, Inc., 932 F.2d 1113, 1118-19, 19
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1253, 1257-58 (5th Cir. 1991) (explaining competitive alternative test),
aff'd sub nom. Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 112 S. Ct. 2753 (1992).
223. Id. at 1119, 19 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1257.
224. Id.
225. Id. at 1120, 19 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1258.
226. Id. at 1118-19, 19 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1258; cf. Taj Mahal Enters., Ltd. v. Trump,
745 F. Supp. 240, 252, 16 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1577, 1586 (D.NJ. 1990) (finding that trade
dress of plaintiff's Indian restaurant, Taj Mahal, was functional). The court in Taj Mahal
stated: "To create a demand for Indian cuisine and culture, it follows that a business's trade
dress should engender images and impressions of things Indian." Taj Mahal, 745 F. Supp. at
252, 16 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1586.
227. See MCCARTHY,supra note 1, § 7:14, at 208-10 (discussing role of descriptive designs,
symbols, and pictures in trademark protection); see also supra note 53 (discussing descriptive-
ness factor).
228. See Taco Cabana, 932 F.2d at 1120, 19 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1258 ("Taco Cabana's
trade dress does not surrender the possibility of inherent distinctiveness merely by embody-
ing certain descriptive elements."). But cf. Taj Mahal, 745 F. Supp. at 252, 16 U.S.P.OJ2d
(BNA) at 1586 (holding that Indian motif consisting of images of minarets, elephants, and so
forth is not inherently distinctive, but rather is common to many facilities with Indian themes).
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ently distinctive. 229
Two Pesos petitioned for certiorari on two issues: (1) whether
inherently distinctive trade dress is protectible under section 43(a)
of the Lanham Act without proof of secondary meaning; and (2)
whether the Fifth Circuit was correct in accepting the jury's finding
that Taco Cabana's trade dress was nonfunctional.2 30 The Supreme
Court granted certiorari only on the first issue. 231 It did so to re-
solve the conflict between the Fifth Circuit and the Second Circuit
as to whether secondary meaning is necessary to establish inherently
distinctive trade dress under section 43(a) of the Lanham Act.232
The Supreme Court held that inherently distinctive trade dress is
protectible under section 43(a) without a showing that the trade
dress had acquired secondary meaning.233 In arriving at its deci-
sion, the Court first analyzed three sections of the Lanham Act: sec-
tions 2,234 43(a),23 5 and 45.236 Using section 45, the Court
established that the purpose of the Lanham Act is to make " 'action-
able the deceptive and misleading use of marks' and 'to protect per-
sons engaged in . . . commerce against unfair competition.' "237
The Court reasoned that section 43(a), on the other hand, protects
unregistered, qualifying trademarks from unfair competition. 238
The Court then used section 2, which sets forth the conditions that
govern which terms qualify as trademarks, to determine whether
trade dress is entitled to protection under section 43(a). Using
these provisions, the Court found that inherently distinctive trade
dress, like word marks, is protectible without proof of secondary
meaning.23 9
229. Taco Cabana, 932 F.2d at 1120, 19 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1258 ("A distinctive trade
dress that is neither descriptive nor functional is ipsofacto inherently distinctive.").
230. Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 112 S. Ct. 2753, 2757 n.6, 23 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1081, 1083 n.6 (1992).
231. Id
232. Id. at 2756-57, 23 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1083.
233. Id. at 2761, 23 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1085.
234. See 15 U.S.C. § 1052 (1988) (establishing requirements for registration of trademarks
on "Principal Register," which grants certain statutory rights). Section 2 allows a descriptive
mark to be registered upon proof that it has become distinctive of the applicant's goods in
commerce. Id. §§ 1052(e)-(f).
235. See id. § 1125(a); supra note 6 (quoting text of amended § 43(a)).
236. See 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (1988) (defining terms found within Lanham Act). Section 45
defines "trademark" as including "any word, name, symbol or device or any combination
thereof.., used to identify and distinguish ... goods .... including a unique product, from
those manufactured or sold by others and to indicate the source of the goods, even if that
source is unknown." lId The section also sets forth the legislative intent of the Act. Id
237. Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 112 S. Ct. 2753, 2757, 23 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1081, 1083 (1992) (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (1988)).
238. Id.
239. Id. at 2758, 23 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1084. The Court arrived at this decision
notwithstanding the absence of the terms "trademark" or "trade dress" in the text of § 43(a).
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Two Pesos argued as it did before the Fifth Circuit that the jury's
finding that Taco Cabana had not acquired secondary meaning was
inconsistent with a finding of inherent distinctiveness. 240 It also ar-
gued in the alternative that inherently distinctive trade dress should
receive limited protection, at least until it could be proven that sec-
ondary meaning did or did not exist.24 1
The Supreme Court disapproved of the notion of according lim-
ited protection to the owner of an inherently distinctive trade dress
until such a time as secondary meaning could be proven. 242 It rea-
soned that only an inherently distinctive trade dress should be pro-
tectible from its earliest use.243 It further reasoned that the
withdrawal of limited protection for failure to acquire secondary
meaning would not be based on an evaluation of the trade dress's
distinctiveness, but would be based on the marketing failure of the
user.
2 4 4
The Court, again construing sections 2 and 43(a), determined
that trade dress has the same ability to serve as a source identifier as
do unregistered trademarks.245 It held that the Second Circuit's re-
quirement of proof of secondary meaning in trade dress infringe-
ment cases, but not in word mark infringement cases, was
unsupported by the language of section 43(a).246 The Court then
See supra note 6 (quoting text of amended § 43(a)). The judicially created expansion of the
reach of § 4 3(a) was acknowledged in the concurrence, however. See Two Pesos, 112 S. Ct. at
2764, 23 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1089 (Stevens,J., concurring) (finding that expansion is consis-
tent with general purposes of Act). The Court also arrived at its decision without reviewing
whether the trade dress was, in fact, inherently distinctive. See id. at 2758, 23 U.S.P.Q2d
(BNA) at 1084 (affirming court of appeals' disposition of issue without explanation).
240. Two Pesos, 112 S. Ct. at 2758, 23 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1084; Petitioner's Brief on the
Merits at 9-10, Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 112 S. Ct. 2753, 23 U.S.P.Q,2d (BNA)
1081 (1992) (No. 91-971).
241. Two Pesos, 112 S. Ct. at 2758-59, 23 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1084. It appears that Two
Pesos thought that Taco Cabana, after a period of nine years, should have been able to prove
secondary meaning. See Petitioner's Reply Brief on the Merits at 3-4, Two Pesos (No. 91-971)
(arguing that Taco Cabana should prove secondary meaning to receive protection); Peti-
tioner's Brief on the Merits at 9, Two Pesos (No. 91-971) (arguing that jury's finding that Taco
Cabana's trade dress, after almost decade of use, had no secondary meaning, meant that no
associational relationship existed between Taco Cabana as commercial source and trade dress
used by Taco Cabana).
242. See Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 112 S. Ct. 2753, 2761, 23 U.S.P.Q2d
(BNA) 1081, 1086 (1992) (declaring that no basis exists in Lanham Act to support suggestion
that secondary meaning is born after specified time); see also Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana,
Inc., 60 U.S.L.W. 4762, 4764 n.8 (U.S.June 26, 1992) (footnote subsequently dropped) (not-
ing that Second Circuit had explicitly rejected theory of secondary meaning in the making,
theory which Supreme Court found similar to argument propounded by petitioner). The
Court felt that the Second Circuit had recognized the problem of piracy created by a require-
ment of secondary meaning for trade dress infringement. Two Pesos, 60 U.S.L.W. at 4764.
243. Two Pesos, 112 S. Ct. at 2759-60, 23 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1084-85.
244. Id. at 2759, 23 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1085.
245. Id. at 2760, 23 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1085-86.
246. Id. at 2760-61, 23 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1086. In fact, neither the pre-1988 version
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held that no basis exists for requiring secondary meaning for inher-
ently distinctive trade dress under section 43(a) of the Lanham
Act.247 The Court wrote:
Denying protection for inherently distinctive nonfunctional trade
dress until after secondary meaning has been established would
allow a competitor, which has not adopted a distinctive trade
dress of its own, to appropriate the originator's dress in other
markets and to deter the originator from expanding into and com-
peting in these areas.2 48
This reasoning echoes the underlying rationale of the doctrine of
secondary meaning in the making, which is that some protection
should exist for a producer who has spent and is spending money in
an effort to create good will and consumer association, but whose
product has not yet acquired secondary meaning, from a competitor
whose appropriation would deter the originator from achieving that
goal.
2 4 9
IV. PROBLEMS WITH THE RENASCENT DOCTRINE
Although the decision of the Supreme Court in Two Pesos appears
to be founded on the principles embodied in the doctrine of secon-
dary meaning in the making,250 the Supreme Court appears to have
gone further than even the proponents of incipient secondary mean-
ing might have gone. 25' The Court has resurrected the secondary
meaning in the making doctrine as the "inherently distinctive
test. ' 252 According to the Supreme Court, if trade dress is "inher-
ently distinctive," legal recognition of the owner's proprietary inter-
est is required, regardless of whether substantial consumer
association has bestowed secondary meaning upon it.253 The Court
nor the revised version of § 43(a) mentions trademarks, trade dress, or secondary meaning.
Seesupra notes 6-10 and accompanying text (discussing and quoting both versions of§ 43(a)).
247. Two Pesos, 112 S. Ct. at 2761, 23 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1086.
248. Id
249. See supra notes 101-22 and accompanying text (discussing origin and operation of
secondary meaning in the making doctrine).
250. See supra part II (discussing evolution of secondary meaning in the making doctrine).
251. In fact, the Southern District Court of New York in H~iagen-Dazs, Inc. v. Frilsen
Glidj6 Ltd., 493 F. Supp. 73, 75, 210 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 204, 205 (S.D.N.Y. 1980), where the
doctrine originated, refused to grant a preliminary injunction against Friisen Gliid6 on simi-
lar grounds. In Hofagen-Dazs, Hiagen-Dazs claimed that Friisen Glidj6 was imitating its
unique Scandinavian marketing theme. Id. at 74, 210 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 205. The court
found that Hiagen-Dazs failed to appreciate the difference between an attempt to trade off
the good will of another and the legitimate imitation of an admittedly effective marketing
technique. See id at 75, 210 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 206 (denying preliminary injunction request
and finding little merit in complaint).
252. Cf Gaske, supra note 71, at 1123-25 (arguing that "inherent distinctiveness" test
should be used in determining infringement of trade dress consisting of packages and display
designs, but not for product design trade dress).
253. See Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 112 S. Ct. 2753, 2758, 23 U.S.P.Q.2d
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does not elaborate on what might constitute inherent distinctive-
ness, however.
The normal requirement for inherent distinctiveness it; that a de-
sign must be unusual or extraordinary in some way. 254 In a case
before the Ninth Circuit similar to the Two Pesos case, a plaintiff
claimed trade dress protection for the total visual image of a restau-
rant that was created by a collection of common or functional ele-
ments. 255 The trade dress claimed by the plaintiff included items
such as director's chairs, white tile, and food preparation areas that
were visible to the customers. 256 It also claimed neon signs, mir-
rors, and exterior yellow awnings. 257 The court found that while the
restaurant's overall impression might be protectible, the trade dress
claimed by the plaintiff was simply not the sort of arbitrary or un-
common trade dress that might qualify as inherently distinctive.258
The trade dress claimed by Taco Cabana was similar. It featured
neon signs in addition to its festive decorations and Mexican arti-
facts. 259 These too are a "collection of common or functional ele-
ments of [Mexican] restaurant decor." 260 It is thus arguable that
Taco Cabana's trade dress in Two Pesos similarly did not rise to the
level of protectible, inherently distinctive, arbitrary, or uncommon
trade dress. 261 A restaurant should not be able to monopolize those
elements that improve the usefulness, efficiency, or appeal of the
(BNA) 1081, 1084 (1992) (dividing issues of proving secondary meaning and proving inher-
ent distinctiveness and holding that either one may be sufficient to afford trade dress
protection).
254. See In re D.C. Comics, Inc., 689 F.2d 1042, 1051 (C.C.P.A. 1982) (Nies, J., concur-
ring) (arguing that protection should be deferred until secondary meaning is established and
recognizing that more unusual designs achieve secondary meaning more quickly).
255. Fuddruckers, Inc. v. Doc's B.R. Others, Inc., 826 F.2d 837, 841,4 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1026, 1029 (9th Cir. 1987).
256. Id. at 842 n.7, 4 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1030 n.7.
257. Id at 840-41, 4 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1028.
258. Id. at 844, 4 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1031.
259. Taco Cabana Int'l, Inc. v. Two Pesos, Inc., 932 F.2d 1113, 1118, 19 U.S.P.Q2d
(BNA) 1253, 1256 (5th Cir. 1991), aff'd sub nom. Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 112 S.
Ct. 2753 (1992).
260. Fuddruckers, 826 F.2d at 844, 4 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1031.
261. It has been noted that the Fifth Circuit's description of the trade dress at issue in
Taco Cabana leads one to conclude that the trade dress created a "Mexican" atmosphere,
which, given the nature of the restaurant, can hardly be described as distinctive. See Excerpts
from the United States Trademark Association's Amicus Brief in Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana Int'l, Inc.
and Taco Cabana, Inc., 82 TRADEMARK REP. 440, 451 (1992) [hereinafter Excerpts] (quoting por-
tions of amicus brief without further comment). The case on which Two Pesos relied,
Prufrock, Ltd. v. Lasater, 781 F.2d 129, 228 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 435 (8th Cir. 1986), held that
§ 43(a) of the Lanham Act did not protect elements of trade dress that relate to the concept or
theme of a restaurant. Prufrock, 781 F.2d at 134, 228 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 438-39; cf. Fuddruckers,
826 F.2d at 846-47, 4 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1033-34 (vacating jury verdict and remanding for
new trial upon finding that evidence of inherent distinctiveness was strong but not sufficient
to justify removing issue from properly instructed jury).
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product or service.262 Unfortunately, the Supreme Court in Two Pe-
sos accepted rulings of both the Fifth Circuit and the district court
on the distinctiveness of Taco Cabana's trade dress without further
inquiry. 263
The Supreme Court recognized in Two Pesos the possible anticom-
petitive effects of requiring secondary meaning, 264 as have the pro-
ponents of secondary meaning in the making.265 Nevertheless, the
Supreme Court appears to have placed the notion of a legitimate
proprietary interest ahead of consumer association. At common
law, a consumer's association of the item with the source, particu-
larly in conjunction with trade dress, determined whether the trade
dress was protectible. 266 In essence, the presence of secondary
meaning served as notice that the mark, or trade dress, was pro-
tectible. 267 Indeed, it appears that the Supreme Court found it use-
ful to dismiss consumer association altogether. 268 In contrast, the
incipient secondary meaning doctrine does not advocate rejecting
262. See Fuddruckers, Inc. v. Doc's B.R. Others, Inc., 225 U.S.P.Q. 133, 134 (D. Ariz.
1984) (ruling that functional components in context of restaurant include those that improve
appeal of product or service as well as those that lead to food being produced in efficient and
sanitary manner).
263. Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 112 S. Ct. 2753, 2758, 23 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1081, 1084 (1992); cf Prufrock, 781 F.2d at 134, 228 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 439 (refusing to grant
protection to theme elements of restaurant and holding instead that providing protection for
particular theme or concept would severely limit ability of others who wished to use same
theme or concept). The Fifth Circuit determination of distinctiveness is a factual issue, re-
viewable under rule 52 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See Soweco, Inc. v. Shell Oil
Co., 617 F.2d 1178, 1183 n.12, 207 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 278, 282 n.12 (5th Cir.) (noting that any
given term's correct categorization is factual issue), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 981 (1980); see also
Forum Corp. of N. Am. v. Forum Ltd., 903 F.2d 434, 438, 14 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1950, 1953
(7th Cir. 1990) (holding that classification of mark on spectrum of distinctiveness is reviewed
on appeal as factual question under clearly erroneous test). But see U.S. Gold & Silver Invest-
ments, Inc. v. Director, United States Mint, 682 F. Supp. 484,487, 5 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1213,
1216 (D. Or. 1987) (holding that determination of mark's status is question of law), aft'd on
other grounds, 885 F.2d 620 (9th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 497 U.S. 1004 (1990). Rule 52 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that appellate courts can set aside factual findings
only when findings are "clearly erroneous." FED. R. Civ. P. 52.
264. Two Pesos, 112 S. Ct. at 2761, 23 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1086.
265. See supra notes 141-43 and accompanying text (discussing proponents' views as to
anticompetitive effects of incipient secondary meaning doctrine).
266. See supra notes 60-89 and accompanying text (discussing common law origin and de-
velopment of secondary meaning).
267. See Hanover Star Milling Co. v. Allen & Wheeler Co., 208 F. 513, 517 (7th Cir. 1913)
(recognizing argument that mark that has acquired secondary meaning should be protectible
because mark signifies to consumers origin of product), aft'd, 240 U.S. 403 (1916); see also
Brief of Private Label Manufacturers Association as Amicus Curiae in Support of Reversal of
Decision Below at 15, Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana Int'l, Inc., 112 S. Ct. 2753, 23
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1081 (1992) (No. 91-971) (arguing that consumer association with trade
dress serves public notice, thereby enabling competitors to avoid imitative design).
268. See Two Pesos, 112 S. Ct. at 2758, 23 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1084 (agreeing with Fifth
Circuit's disposition of issue by stating that protection grounded in "inherent distinctiveness"
of product could be granted without showing of consumer association between trade dress
and producer).
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consumer association. Instead, the doctrine proposes a loosening
of the standards of proof of consumer association.2 69 The inher-
ently distinctive test, on the other hand, substitutes a trier of fact's
impressions of the trade dress' distinctiveness for proof of con-
sumer association. 270
Furthermore, in using the inherently distinctive test, the Court
has called into question the viability of functionality in trade
dress. 271 Although the question of the functionality of Taco Ca-
bana's trade dress was not before the Court, it should have been
considered. 272 The doctrine of functionality helps to limit trade-
mark and common law protection for trade dress. 273 If a particular
feature is essential to a product's use or if it affects the cost or qual-
ity of the article, then the feature is functional and cannot be pro-
tected. 274 In the case of a restaurant's interior decor, however, the
trade dress is not the packaging, but the ambience. 275 Thus, the
issue before a court in restaurant trade dress cases becomes a ques-
tion of whether the decor has aesthetic functionality and not
whether it has utility of design.27 6
In Taco Cabana, the Fifth Circuit reviewed the jury's findings on
the issue of functionality. 277 Although Taco Cabana claimed as its
269. See supra notes 101-13 and accompanying text (discussing incipient secondary mean-
ing and citing cases applying relaxed secondary meaning requirement).
270. See Brown, supra note 123, at 1380 (arguing that inherently distinctive test replaces
consumer association proof with impermissible intuitive judging).
271. See Brown, supra note 123, at 1380 (arguing that purpose of functionality inquiry is
diminished by use of inherent distinctiveness test); Thomas F. Smegal,Jr., High Court Considers
Trade Dress Issues, NAT'L LJ., Apr. 27, 1992, at 20, 22 ("A ruling that trade dress can be inher-
ently distinctive could lead to a lessening of concern about the functionality of trade dress
features.").
272. The Court did not grant certiorari on the question of functionality and considered
for the purposes of the appeal that the lower courts' rulings on that issue were correct. Two
Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 112 S. Ct. 2753, 2757-58, 23 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1081, 1083-
84 (1992).
273. See supra notes 29-47 and accompanying text (discussing purpose and application of
functionality doctrine).
274. Inwood Lab., Inc. v. Ives Lab., Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 850 n.10, 214 U.S.P.Q (BNA) 1,4
n.10 (1982).
275. Gifford, supra note 5, at 789.
276. See, e.g., Taj Mahal Enters. v. Trump, 745 F. Supp. 240, 252, 16 U.S.P.Q2d (BNA)
1577, 1586 (D.N.J. 1990) (applying aesthetic functionality test in denying trade dress protec-
tion alternative test); T.G.I. Friday's, Inc. v. International Restaurant Group, Inc., 405 F.
Supp. 698, 708-09, 189 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 806, 814 (M.D. La. 1975) (analyzing aesthetics and
finding that "turn-of-century" motif was probably impossible to protect), aff'd, 569 F.2d 895
(5th Cir. 1978). But see Swann, supra note 218, at 408 (arguing that courts have failed in
restaurant trade dress cases to distinguish between concepts of utilitarian and aesthetic func-
tionality). Jerre Swann argues the proper test is whether the interior decor is generic. Swann,
supra note 218, at 408-15; see also Fuddrucker's Inc. v. Doc's B.R. Others, Inc., 225 U.S.P.Q,
(BNA) 133, 133 (D. Ariz. 1984) (finding that "[r]estaurant trade dress is typically much more
complex than that of simple consumer product.").
277. Taco Cabana Int'l, Inc. v. Two Pesos, Inc., 932 F.2d 1113, 1118-19, 19 U.S.P.Q2d
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trade dress the "total image" created by its decor,278 the court ap-
plied the utilitarian test. It asked whether there were other viable
alternatives available to the defendant. 279 Using this definition of
functionality, the answer would almost always be yes, resulting in
protection of a restaurant's decor.280
A better question would have been to ask whether the primary
function of the restaurant's trade dress was to serve as a source indi-
cator or whether it merely provided a pleasing ambience for the cus-
tomers.281 If the primary function of the trade dress is to indicate
source, then consistent use of those elements would be required in
every restaurant operating under that name.28 2 The decor sought
to be protected, however, would have to be unique; that is, it would
have to be conceptually separate from the product.28 3 For example,
the decor of a discotheque located in a former church, with its
stained glass windows intact, would properly be considered concep-
tually separate from its service, and protectible. 28 4
If, however, the total visual impact of the trade dress was inher-
ently compatible with the restaurant theme, then arguably the pri-
mary function of the trade dress was not to operate as an indicator
of source.285 Under this test, the trade dress claimed by Taco Ca-
bana would have been found unprotectible. As Two Pesos claimed,
it is difficult, if not impossible to separate a Mexican "concept" from
(BNA) 1253, 1257 (5th Cir. 1991), aff'dsub nom. Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 112 S.
Ct. 2753 (1992).
278. Id. at 1119, 19 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1257.
279. Id
280. See id. (finding that in case of upscale Mexican restaurant theme, multitude of varia-
tions exists); Gifford, supra note 5, at 784 (arguing that functionality and alternative means
tests properly determine outcome based on presumption granting benefit to innovator).
281. If a pleasing ambience was the goal of a restaurateur, then the trade dress would be
properly classified as generic and would not be protectible. See Swann, supra note 218, at 413
(arguing that restaurant interiors are often associated with products and not producers, and
thus are not protectible).
282. Excerpts, supra note 261, at 447.
283. See Dumas, supra note 29, at 493 (proposing that properties for determining function-
ality of nonmechanical product is conceptual separability and that if feature is not concep-
tually separable from product, then it is functional).
284. I am referring to the Limelight discotheque, which inhabits an 1846 landmark build-
ing, formerly the Church of Holy Communion, at 6th Avenue (Avenue of the Americas) and
20th Street in New York City, New York.
285. See Taj Mahal Enters. v. Trump, 745 F. Supp. 240, 252, 16 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1577,
1586 (D.NJ. 1990) (stating that "elements of a trade dress which relate to the concept or
theme of a restaurant are functional as they enhance consumer demand for the restaurant's
food"); Proctor, supra note 21, at 29 (noting "as such [marketing] techniques become more
and more related to the products or services... [it] becomes more likely that such techniques
are not distinctive, and the users ... should be required to demonstrate the existence of
secondary meaning before they can claim any trademark rights to such techniques"); Swann,
supra note 218, at 413-14 (positing that restaurant interior "should at least stand apart from or
even clash with its surroundings" in order to become source indicative).
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a Mexican restaurant.286 If the purpose of the restaurant's trade
dress is to be merely pleasing to the diners or conjure up attributes
of the restaurant, then it is not protectible. An aesthetically pleasing
ambiance is an important ingredient in the success of any restau-
rant. It is unlikely that a consumer would spend money to eat in a
restaurant that fails to provide its diners with a pleasing atmos-
phere. Therefore, any restauranteur should be allowed to appropri-
ate those elements. Had the court examined the issue in this way,
the focus of inquiry would more properly have been on the content
of the trade dress itself 28 7 and not on the intent of the
competitor.288
In failing to review the question of functionality, the Supreme
Court missed an opportunity to define the factor more clearly, par-
ticularly for cases in which functionality may be combined with the
"inherently distinctive" test.28 9 This result suggests that the doc-
trine has no real purpose when the object of inquiry is inherently
distinctive. Therefore, if functionality is no longer viable and secon-
dary meaning is no longer an "important ingredient," then no more
limits remain to preclude monopolization. The problem with Two
Pesos is that the Supreme Court has accomplished precisely what was
feared by the opponents of secondary meaning in the making: it has
put into place the machinery for creating a monopoly in trade dress
without providing any safeguards. 290
The incipient secondary meaning doctrine provides protection for
a market entrant whose dress has not yet acquired secondary mean-
ing. The doctrine serves the purpose of the Lanham Act, which cen-
ters on fostering competition while at the same time protecting the
consumer.291 Protection of the first comer's trade dress would force
the second to design around its rival's dress, thereby providing the
first with some benefit. 292 Requiring proof of secondary meaning or
286. Taco Cabana, 932 F.2d at 1118-19, 19 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1257.
287. See Excerpts, supra note 261, at 451 (arguing that appropriate inquiry for lower court
was whether Taco Cabana's trade dress was so unique and different from other restaurant
designs that it could be deemed inherently distinctive).
288. SeeJ. Steven Patterson, Comment, Defining the Role of Defendant's Intentions Under Section
43(a) of the Lanham Act: Centaur Communications v. A/S/M Communications, 46 WASH. &
LEE L. REv. 335, 354-55 (1989) (arguing that trademark infringement decisions should not
rest on subjective intentions of alleged infringers).
289. See Sicilia Di R. Biebow & Co. v. Cox, 732 F.2d 417,422 (5th Cir. 1984) (stating that
doctrine of functionality has been in flux since its inception, resulting in differing circuit defi-
nitions that create no judicial agreement regarding its present and proper scope).
290. See, e.g., Brown, supra note 123, at 1378 ("Slack doctrine leads to the creation of
monopolies, large and small, without the safeguards that attend the statutory monopolies of
copyright and patent.").
291. See supra notes 101-13 and accompanying text (discussing emergence and history of
incipient secondary meaning doctrine); supra note 8 (discussing purpose of Lanham Act).
292. See, e.g., Schwinn Bicycle Co. v. Diversified Prods. Corp., 740 F. Supp. 517, 520, 15
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even secondary meaning in the making prior to granting protection
in the trade dress would limit this protection and ensure that com-
petition would remain viable.293
The arguments made against secondary meaning in the making
are even more applicable here. Application of the inherently dis-
tinctive test could result in judicial confusion because the Court did
not provide any criteria for determining when a product design is
"inherently distinctive." As we all know, "beauty is in the eye of the
beholder." Must we apply these subjective principles in determin-
ing the scope of the term "inherently distinctive"? The absence of
any guiding standards could fuel the same unprincipled decisions
that were arguably to have been the result of the application of sec-
ondary meaning in the making.2 94
CONCLUSION
The competing interests of the needs of the public and those of
producers have always required balancing when the law is ap-
plied.295 On the one hand, the public has an interest in lower prices
and free competition that result from unfettered copying of prod-
ucts and trade dress when such items are not protected by federal
intellectual property laws. 2 96 On the other hand, the producer has
an interest in protecting its property rights. 297 In addition, the con-
sumer should be protected from being confused as to the source of
goods or services, but not protected from similarities in
appearances.
The doctrine of secondary meaning in the making managed to at-
tain those goals by maintaining the integrity of the doctrine of func-
tionality and relaxing the strict standards of secondary meaning.
While the doctrine forced second comers to design around an al-
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1065, 1069 (N.D. Ill. 1990) (holding that competitor's design was suffi-
ciently distinctive to avoid infringement of design patent); Durango Herald, Inc. v. Riddle,
719 F. Supp. 941, 952, 11 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1052, 1061 (D. Colo. 1988) (holding that in-
dependent producer of telephone directory must design around original product).
293. See Brown, supra note 123, at 1374 (arguing that secondary meaning or source identi-
fication is vital to unfair competition claims).
294. See supra part II.B (discussing scholarly debate regarding advantages and disadvan-
tages of secondary meaning the in making).
295. See Note, Trademark Protection of Objects and Configurations: A Critical Analysis, 59 MINN.
L. REv. 541, 541, 556-57 (1975) (noting that interests to be balanced include those of pro-
ducer, consumer, and potential or real competitors).
296. See Note, The Public Interest and the Right to Copy Non-Functional Product Features, 19 WM.
& MARY L. REV. 317, 317 (1977) (arguing that markets free from overprotection of product
features benefit consumers).
297. See Smegal, supra note 271, at 22 (arguing that one public policy interest encom-
passed in secondary meaning requirement is protecting producer's interest in its product's
clear identification).
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ready existing trade dress, thereby fostering competition, it also
benefitted the consumer by offering new designs and packaging.
The incentives to produce new trade dress also ensured that the
consumer would not be confused as to the source of the goods.
Furthermore, it protected the producer's property rights.
In refashioning the doctrine, however, the Court threw out the
baby with the bath water. The procompetitive effects of the doctrine
of secondary meaning in the making appear to have been jettisoned
in the Supreme Court's pronouncement of the role of secondary
meaning in inherently distinctive trade dress. Although the
Supreme Court refashioned the doctrine in order to secure good
will for the business owner 298 and ostensibly to foster competition,
it appears that instead of fostering competition, the Supreme
Court's decision in Two Pesos in effect chills competition-at least it
had that effect for Two Pesos. 299 Under the Supreme Court's rul-
ing, the first comer can, without proof of any consumer recognition,
stake a claim to a particular style simply by virtue of being the first
with an "inherently distinctive" dress.300 The result is that competi-
tion will be foreclosed, 30 1 and the cost to the consumer will
increase.302
298. Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 112 S. Ct. 2753, 2760-61, 23 U.S.P.Q2d
(BNA) 1081, 1086 (1992).
299. OnJanuary 12,1993, Two Pesos announced that it had entered into an agreement to
sell its restaurant assets to Taco Cabana. Two Pesos Inc To Sell Its Restaurant Chain to Rival Taco
Cabana, WALL ST.J.,Jan. 13, 1993, at A6.
300. See Two Pesos, 112 S. Ct. at 2767, 23 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1091 (Thomas,J., concur-
ring) ("The first user of an arbitrary package ... should be entitled to the presumption that
his package represents him without having to show that it does so in fact.").
301. Supreme Court affirms 'Thou shalt not steal' rule in Copycat cafe case, NATioN's RESTAURANT
NEws NEwsPAPER,July 13, 1992, at 21 (speculating that court's decision could stimulate litiga-
tion and affect lawsuits over packaging of everything from soda pop to designer wristwatches).
302. See Richard Stern &Joel Hoffman, Public Injury and the Public Interest. Secondary Mean-
ing in the Law of Unfair Competition, 52 TRADEMARK REP. 1271, 1276 n.23 (discussing negative
effects on competition when one producer is granted protection of its trade dress).
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